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The adoption of differential privacy is growing but the complexity of designing private, efficient and accurate
algorithms is still high. We propose a novel programming framework and system, ϵktelo, for implementing
both existing and new privacy algorithms. For the task of answering linear counting queries, we show that
nearly all existing algorithms can be composed from operators, each conforming to one of a small number of
operator classes. While past programming frameworks have helped to ensure the privacy of programs, the
novelty of our framework is its significant support for authoring accurate and efficient (as well as private)
programs.
After describing the design and architecture of the ϵktelo system, we show that ϵktelo is expressive,
allows for safer implementations through code reuse, and that it allows both privacy novices and experts to
easily design algorithms. We provide a number of novel implementation techniques to support the generality
and scalability of ϵktelo operators. These include methods to automatically compute lossless reductions of
the data representation, implicit matrices that avoid materialized state but still support computations, and
iterative inference implementations which generalize techniques from the privacy literature.
We demonstrate the utility of ϵktelo by designing several new state-of-the-art algorithms, most of which
result from simple re-combinations of operators defined in the framework. We study the accuracy and
scalability of ϵktelo plans in a thorough empirical evaluation.
CCS Concepts: • Security and privacy→Privacy-preserving protocols;Database and storage security;
• Theory of computation→ Theory of database privacy and security.
ACM Reference Format:
Dan Zhang, Ryan McKenna, Ios Kotsogiannis, George Bissias, Michael Hay, Ashwin Machanavajjhala,
and Gerome Miklau. 2018. ϵktelo: A Framework for Defining Differentially-Private Computations. -, -,
Article - ( 2018), 42 pages. https://doi.org/10.1145/nnnnnnn.nnnnnnn
1 INTRODUCTION
As the collection of personal data has increased, many institutions face an urgent need for reliable
privacy protection mechanisms. They must balance the need to protect individuals with demands to
use collected data for new applications, to model their users’ behavior, or share data with external
partners. Differential privacy [11, 12] is a rigorous privacy definition that offers a persuasive
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assurance to individuals, provable guarantees, and the ability to analyze the impact of combined
releases of data. Informally, an algorithm satisfies differential privacy if its output does not change
too much when any one record in the input database is added or removed.
The research community has actively investigated differential privacy and algorithms are known
for a variety of tasks ranging from data exploration to query answering to machine learning.
However, the adoption of differentially private techniques in real-world applications remains rare.
This is because implementing programs that provably satisfy privacy and ensure sufficient utility
for a given task is still extremely challenging for non-experts in differential privacy. In fact, the few
real world deployments of differential privacy – like OnTheMap [2, 18] (a U.S. Census Bureau data
product), RAPPOR [15] (a Google Chrome extension), and Apple’s private collection of emoji’s
and HealthKit data – have required teams of privacy experts to ensure that implementations meet
the privacy standard and that they deliver acceptable utility. There are at least three important
challenges in implementing and deploying differentially private algorithms.
The first and foremost challenge is the difficulty of designing utility-optimal algorithms: i.e.,
algorithms that can extract the maximal accuracy given a fixed “privacy budget.” While there are a
number of general-purpose differentially private algorithms, such as the Laplace Mechanism [11],
they typically offer suboptimal accuracy if applied directly. A carefully designed algorithm can
improve on general-purpose methods by an order of magnitude or more—without weakening
privacy: that is, accuracy is improved by careful engineering and sophisticated algorithm design.
One might hope for a single dominant algorithm for each task, but a recent empirical study [20]
showed that the accuracy of existing algorithms is complex: no single algorithm delivers the best
accuracy across the range of settings in which it may be deployed. The choice of the best algorithm
may depend on the particular task, the available privacy budget, and properties of the input data.
Therefore, to achieve state-of-the-art accuracy, a practitioner currently has to make a host of
complex algorithm choices, which may include choosing a low-level representation for the input
data, translating their queries into that representation, choosing among available algorithms, and
setting parameters. The best choices will vary for different input data and different analysis tasks.
The second challenge is that the tasks in which practitioners are interested are diverse and may
differ from those considered in the literature. Hence, existing algorithms need to be adapted to new
application settings, a non-trivial task. For instance, techniques used by modern privacy algorithms
include optimizing error over multiple queries by identifying common sub-expressions, obtaining
noisy counts from the data at different resolutions, and using complex inference techniques to
reconstruct answers to target queries from noisy, inconsistent and incomplete measurement queries.
But different algorithms use different specialized operators for these sub-tasks, and it can be
challenging to adapt them to new situations. Thus, designing utility-optimal algorithms requires
significant expertise in a complex and rapidly-evolving research literature.
A third equally important challenge is that correctly implementing differentially private algo-
rithms can be difficult. There are known examples of algorithm pseudocode in research papers not
satisfying differential privacy as claimed. For instance, Zhang et al [48] showed that many variants
of a primitive called the sparse vector technique do not in fact meet their claims of differential
privacy. Differential privacy can also be broken through incorrect implementations of valid algo-
rithms. For example, Mironov [32] showed that standard implementations of basic algorithms like
the Laplace Mechanism [11] can violate differential privacy because of their use of floating point
arithmetic. Privacy-oriented programming frameworks such as PINQ [13, 31, 36], Fuzz [17], PrivIn-
fer [7] and LightDP [45] help implement programs whose privacy can be verified with relatively
little human intervention. While they help to ensure the privacy criterion is met, they may impose
their own restrictions and offer little or no support for designing utility-optimal programs. In fact,
2
in PINQ [31], some state-of-the-art algorithms involving inference and domain reduction cannot
be implemented.
To address the aforementioned challenges, we have developed ϵktelo, a programming framework
and system that aids programmers in developing differentially private programs with high utility.
ϵktelo programs can be used to solve a core class of statistical tasks that involve answering
counting queries over a table of arbitrary dimension (described in Sec. 3). Tasks supported by
ϵktelo include releasing contingency tables, multi-dimensional histograms, answering OLAP and
range queries, and implementing private machine learning algorithms. ϵktelo is an open-source
system under active development1.
This paper makes the following contributions.
First, we recognize that, for the tasks we consider, virtually all algorithms in the research literature
can be described as combinations of a small number of operators that perform basic functions. Our
first contribution is to abstract and unify key subroutines into a small set of operator classes in
ϵktelo– tranformations, query selection, partition selection, measurement and inference. Different
algorithms differ in (i) the sequence in which these operations are performed on the data, and (ii)
the specific implementation of operations from these classes. In our system, differentially private
programs are described as plans over a high level library of operator implementations supported
by ϵktelo. Plans described in ϵktelo are expressive enough to reimplement all state-of-the-art
algorithms from DPBench [20].
Second, if operator implementations are vetted and shown to satisfy differential privacy, then
plans implemented in ϵktelo come with a proof of privacy. This proof requires a non-trivial
extension of a formal analysis of a past framework [13]. This relieves the algorithm designer of the
burden of proving their programs are private. By isolating privacy critical functions in operators,
ϵktelo reduces the amount of code that needs to be verified for privacy. In future work, we hope
to implement operators in ϵktelo using programming frameworks like LightDP to eliminate this
burden too.
Third, we describe a number of novel implementation techniques which support the generality
and efficiency of ϵktelo. We design sophisticated matrix support into ϵktelo, which allows plan
authors to represent and operate on matrix objects that would be infeasible to represent otherwise;
We describe a general-purpose, efficient and scalable inference engine that subsumes customized
inference subroutines from the literature; and we describe a new dimensionality reduction operator
that is applicable to plans that answer a workload of linear counting queries, and can reduce error
by at most 3× and runtime at most 5×. These systems innovations are central to the goals of ϵktelo
because they give plan authors more freedom to describe plans without being limited by efficiency
concerns or bound by the need to design custom inference techniques.
The operator-based approach to implementing differentially private programs has the following
benefits:● Modularity: ϵktelo enables code reuse since the same operator can be used in multiple algo-
rithms. This helps safety, as there is less code to verify the correctness of an implementation, and
it amplifies innovation, as any improvement to an operator is inherited by all plans containing
it.● Transparency: By expressing algorithms as plans with operators from operator classes, differ-
ences/similarities of competing algorithms can be discerned. Moreover, algorithm modifications
easier to explore. Further, it is possible to identify general rules for restructuring plans (like
heuristics in query optimizers).
1Available at https://github.com/ektelo/ektelo
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Algorithm 1 ϵktelo CDF Estimator
1: D ← Protected(source_uri) ▷ Init
2: D ←Where(D, sex == ‘M’ AND age ∈ (︀30, 39⌋︀) ▷ Transform
3: D ← select(salary) ▷ Transform
4: x← T-Vectorize(D) ▷ Transform
5: P← AHPpartition (x, ϵ⇑2) ▷ Partition Select
6: x¯← V-ReduceByPartition (x, P) ▷ Transform
7: M← Identity(⋃︀x¯⋃︀) ▷ Query Select
8: y← VecLaplace(x¯,M, ϵ⇑2) ▷ Query
9: xˆ ← NNLS(P, y) ▷ Inference
10: Wpre ← Prefix(⋃︀x⋃︀) ▷ Query Select
11: returnWpre ⋅ xˆ ▷ Output
● Flexibility: Practitioners can now use existing operators from different algorithms and recombine
them in arbitrary ways – allowing them to invent new algorithms that borrow ideas from the
state-of-art – without the need for a custom privacy analysis.
We demonstrate the benefits of ϵktelo by re-implementing a wide range of algorithms from the
literature, using ϵktelo to design original algorithms with improved error and efficiency, and by
using ϵktelo to address two case studies. For a use-case of releasing Census data tabulations, we
define a new algorithm that offers a 10× improvement over the best competitor from the literature.
For building a private classifier, we used ϵktelo to design algorithms that beat all available baselines.
Organization We provide an overview of ϵktelo and highlight its design in the next section. After
providing background in Sec. 3, we describe the execution framework and methods for privacy
enforcement Sec. 4. The operator classes are described in Sec. 5 and we show the expressiveness of
ϵktelo plans in Sec. 6 by re-implementing existing algorithms. Efficient matrix support is described
in Sec. 7, including improvements to inference. Sec. 8 describes our method for selecting and optimal
partition given a workload. We then put ϵktelo into action by designing new algorithms for cases
studies Sec. 9, followed by a thorough experimental evaluation in Sec. 10. We discuss related work
and conclude in Secs. 11 and 12.
2 OVERVIEW AND DESIGN PRINCIPLES
In this section we provide an overview of ϵktelo by presenting an example algorithm written in
the framework. Then we discuss the principles guiding the design of ϵktelo.
2.1 An example plan: CDF estimation
In ϵktelo, differentially private algorithms are described using plans composed over a rich library
of operators. Most of the plans described in this paper are linear sequences of operators, but ϵktelo
also supports plans with iteration, recursion, and branching. Operators supported by ϵktelo
perform a well defined task and typically capture a key algorithm design idea from the state-of-the-
art. Each operator belongs to one of five operator classes based on its input-output specification.
These are: (a) transformation, (b) query, (c) inference, (d) query selection, and (e) partition selection.
Operators are fully described in Sec. 5 and listed in Fig. 1.
First, we describe an example ϵktelo plan and use it to introduce the different operator classes.
Algorithm 1 shows the pseudocode for a plan authored in ϵktelo, which takes as input a table D
with schema [Age, Gender, Salary] and returns the differentially private estimate of the empirical
cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the Salary attribute, for males in their 30’s. The plan is
fairly sophisticated and works in multiple steps. First the plan uses transformation operators on the
4
input table D to filter out records that do not correspond to males in their 30’s (Line 2), selecting
only the salary attribute (Line 3). Then it uses another transformation operator to construct a vector
of counts x that contains one entry for each value of salary. xi represents the number of rows in
the input (in this case males in their 30’s) with salary equal to i .
Before adding noise to this histogram, the plan uses a partition selection operator, AHPpartition
(Line 5). Operators in this class choose a partition of the data vector which is later used in a
transformation. AHPpartition uses the sensitive data to identify a partition P of the counts in x
such that counts within a partition group are close. Since AHPpartition uses the input data, it
expends part of the privacy budget (in this case ϵ⇑2). AHPpartition is a key subroutine in AHP
[49], which was shown to have state-of-the-art performance for histogram estimation [20].
Next the plan uses V-ReduceByPartition (Line 6), another transformation operator on x, to
apply the partition P computed by AHPpartition. This results in a new reduced vector x¯ that
contains one entry for each partition group in P and the entry is computed by adding up counts
within each group.
The plan now specifies a set of measurement queriesM on x¯ using the Identity query selection
operator (Line 7). The identity matrix corresponds to querying all the entries in x¯ (sinceMx¯ = x¯).
Query selection operators do not answer any query, but rather specify which queries should be
estimated. (This is analogous to how partition selection operators only select a partition but do not
apply it.) Next, Vector Laplace returns differentially private answers to all the queries inM. It
does so by automatically calculating the sensitivity of the vectorized queries – which depends on
all upstream data transformations – and then using the standard Laplace mechanism (Line 8) to
add noise. This operator consumes the remainder of the privacy budget (again ϵ⇑2).
So far the plan has computed an estimated histogram of partition group counts y, while our
goal is to return the empirical CDF on the original salary domain. Hence, the plan uses the noisy
counts on the reduced domain y to infer non-negative counts in the original vector space of x by
invoking an inference operator NNLS (short for non-negative least squares) (Line 9). NNLS(P,y)
finds a solution, xˆ, to the problem Pxˆ = y, such that all entries of xˆ are non-negative. Lastly, the
plan constructs the set of queries,Wpre, needed to compute the empirical CDF (a lower triangular
n × n matrix representing prefix sums) by calling the query selection operator Prefix(n) (Line 10),
and returns the output (Line 11).
2.2 ϵktelo design principles
The design of ϵktelo is guided by the following principles. With each principle, we include
references to future sections of the paper where the consequent benefits are demonstrated.
Expressiveness ϵktelo is designed to be expressive, meaning that a wide variety of state-of-
the-art algorithms can be written succinctly as ϵktelo plans. To ensure expressiveness,
we carefully designed a foundational set of operator classes that cover features commonly
used by leading differentially private algorithms. We demonstrate the expressiveness of our
operators by showing in Sec. 6 that the algorithms from the recent DPBench benchmark [20]
can be readily re-implemented in ϵktelo.
Privacy “for free” ϵktelo is designed so that any plan written in ϵktelo automatically satisfies
differential privacy. The formal statement of this privacy property is in Sec. 4.3. This means
that plan authors are not burdened with writing privacy proofs for each algorithm they write.
Furthermore, when invoking privacy-critical operators that take noisy measurements of
the data, the magnitude of the noise is automatically calibrated. As described in Sec. 4, this
requires tracking all data transformations and measurements and using this information to
handle each new measurement request.
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Reduced privacy verification effort Ensuring that an algorithm implementation satisfies differ-
ential privacy requires verifying that it matches the algorithm specification. The design of
ϵktelo reduces the amount of code that must be vetted each time an algorithm is crafted.
First, since an algorithm is expressed as a plan and all plans automatically satisfy differential
privacy, the code to be vetted is solely the individual operators. Second, operators need to be
vetted only once but may be reused across multiple algorithms. Finally, it is not necessary to
vet every operator, but only the privacy-critical ones (as discussed in Sec. 4, ϵktelomandates
a clear distinction between privacy-critical and non-private operators). This means that
verifying the privacy of an algorithm requires checking fewer lines of code. In Sec. 6, we
compare the verification effort to vet the DPBench codebase2 against the effort required to
vet these algorithms when expressed as plans in ϵktelo.
Transparency In ϵktelo, all algorithms are expressed in the same form: each is a plan, consisting
a sequence of operators where each operator is selected from a class of operators based on
common functionality. This facilitates algorithm comparison and makes differences between
algorithms more apparent. In Sec. 6, we summarize the plan signatures of a number of
state-of-the-art algorithms (pictured in Fig. 2). These plan signatures reveal similarities and
common idioms in existing algorithms. These are difficult to discover from the research
literature or through code inspection.
Efficiency and Scalability Many ϵktelo plans compute on data vectors formed from projections
of an input table. The current implementation of ϵktelo relies on storing these vectors in
memory on a single machine. Even under this restriction, it is challenging to get all ϵktelo
operators to run efficiently. Our specialized matrix representation techniques, presented in
Sec. 7, allow many of the key operators to scale to large data vectors without imposing undue
restrictions on plan authors.
We believe that ϵktelo, by supporting the design principles described above, provides an
improved platform for designing and deploying differentially private algorithms.
3 PRELIMINARIES
The input to ϵktelo is a database instance of a single-relation schema T (A1,A2, . . . ,Aℓ). Each
attribute Ai is assumed to be discrete (or suitably discretized). A condition formula, ϕ, is a Boolean
condition that can be evaluated on any tuple of T . We use ϕ(T ) to denote the number of tuples
in T for which ϕ is true. A number of operators in ϵktelo answer linear queries over the table. A
linear query is the linear combination of any finite set of condition counts:
Definition 3.1 (Linear counting query (declarative)). A linear query q onT is defined by conditions
ϕ1 . . .ϕk and coefficients c1 . . . ck ∈ R and returns q(T ) = c1ϕ1(T ) + ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ + ckϕk(T ).
It is common to consider a vector representation of the database, denoted x = (︀x1 . . .xn⌋︀, where
xi is equal to the number of tuples of type i for each possible tuple type in the relational domain of
T . The size of this vector, n, is the product of the attribute domains. Then it follows that any linear
counting query has an equivalent representation as a vector of n coefficients, and can be evaluated
by taking a dot product with x. Abusing notation slightly, let ϕ(i) = 1 if ϕ evaluates to true for the
tuple type i and 0 otherwise.
Definition 3.2 (Linear counting query (vector)). For a linear query q defined by ϕ1 . . .ϕk and
c1 . . . ck , its equivalent vector form is q = (︀q1 . . .qn⌋︀ where qi = c1ϕ1(i) + ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ + ckϕk(i). The
evaluation of the linear query is q ⋅ x, where x is vector representation of T .
2Available at: https://github.com/dpcomp-org/dpcomp_core
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In the sequel, we will use vectorized representations of the data frequently. We refer to the domain
as the size of x, the vectorized table. This vector is sometimes large and a number of methods for
avoiding its materialization are discussed later.
Let T and T ′ denote two tables of the same schema, and let T ⊕T ′ = (T −T ′) ∪ (T ′ −T ) denote
the symmetric difference between them. We say that T and T ′ are neighbors if ⋃︀T ⊕T ′⋃︀ = 1.
Definition 3.3 (Differential Privacy [11]). A randomized algorithm 𝒜 is ϵ-differentially private if
for any two instances T , T ′ such that ⋃︀T ⊕T ′⋃︀ = 1, and any subset of outputs S ⊆ Ranдe(𝒜),
Pr(︀𝒜(T ) ∈ S⌋︀ ≤ exp(ϵ) × Pr(︀𝒜(T ′) ∈ S⌋︀
Differentially private algorithms can be composed with each other and other algorithms using
composition rules, such as sequential and parallel composition [31] and post-processing [12]. Let
f be a function on tables that outputs real numbers. The sensitivity of the function is defined as:
max⋃︀T⊕T ′⋃︀=1⋃︀f (T ) − f (T ′)⋃︀.
Definition 3.4 (Stability). Let д be a transformation function that takes a data source (table
or vector) as input and returns a new data source (of the same type) as output. For any pair of
sources S and S ′ let ⋃︀S ⊕ S ′⋃︀ denote the distance between sources. If the sources are both tables,
then this distance is the size of the symmetric difference; if the sources are both vectors, then this
distance is the L1 norm; if the sources are of mixed type, it’s undefined. Then the stability of д is:
maxS,S ′∶⋃︀S⊕S ′⋃︀=1 ⋃︀д(S)⊕д(S ′)⋃︀. When the stability of д is at most c for some constant c , we say that
д is c-stable.
4 EXECUTION FRAMEWORK AND PRIVACY ENFORCEMENT
This section describes the execution environment and then formalizes the claim that any program
executed in ϵktelo satisfies differential privacy.
4.1 Protected Kernel and Client Space
The execution framework consists of an untrusted client space and a protected kernel that encloses
the private data. An ϵktelo program, which we call a plan, runs in the unprotected client space.
When the plan needs to interact with the private data, it does so through privileged operators that
can issue requests to the protected kernel. Such operators may, for example, request that protected
kernel apply a data transformation or perhaps return a noisy measurement. The protected kernel
services requests from privileged operators, only executing them if their cost is within the available
privacy budget. The distinction between the client space and the protected kernel is a fundamental
one in ϵktelo. It allows authors to write plans that consist of operator calls embedded in otherwise
arbitrary code (which may freely include conditionals, loops, recursion, etc.).
The protected kernel is initialized by specifying a single protected data object—an input tableT—
and a global privacy budget, which we denote as ϵtot . Note that requests for data transformations
may cause the protected kernel to derive additional data sources. Thus, the protected kernel
maintains a data source environment, which consists of a mapping between data source variables,
which are exposed to the client, and the protected data objects, which are kept private. In addition,
the data source environment tracks the transformation lineage of each data source. It also maintains
the stability of each transformation (defined in Sec. 3). Note that in describing operators (Sec. 5),
we speak informally of operators having data sources as inputs and outputs rather than data source
variables. A layer of indirection is always maintained in the implementation but sometimes elided
in our descriptions to simplify the presentation.
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4.2 Operator types
Operators have one of three types, based on their interaction with the protected kernel. The first
type is a Private operator, which requests that the protected kernel perform some action on the
private data (e.g., a transformation) but receives only an acknowledgement that the operation has
been performed. The second type is a Private→Public operator, which receives information about
the private data (e.g., a measurement) and thus consumes privacy budget. The last type is a Public
operator, which does not interact with the protected kernel at all and can be executed entirely in
client space. An example of a public operator would operators that perform inference on the noisy
measurements received from the protected kernel. When describing operators in Sec. 5, we color
code them based on their type.
4.3 Privacy Guarantee
In this section, we state the privacy guarantee offered by ϵktelo. Informally, ϵktelo ensures that
if the protected kernel is initialized with a source database T and a privacy budget ϵtot , then any
plan (chosen by the client) will satisfy ϵtot -differential privacy with respect to T . Note that if the
client exhausts the privacy budget, subsequent calls to Private→Public operators will return an
exception, indicating that they are not permitted. Importantly, an exception itself does not leak
sensitive information – i.e., the decision to return an exception does not depend on the private
state.
A transcript is a sequence of operator calls and their responses. Formally, let rk = ∐︀op1,a1, . . . ,opk ,ak ̃︀
denote a length k sequence where opi is an operator call and ai the response. We assume that the
value of opi is a deterministic function of a1, . . . ,ai−1. We use Rk = rk to denote the event that the
first k operations result in transcript rk . Letℛk be the set of all possible transcripts of length k . We
assume that all Private→Public operators output values from an arbitrary, but finite set. Thus, the
set of possible transcripts is finite. Let P(Rk = rk ⋃︀ Init(T ,ϵtot )) be the conditional probability of
event Rk = rk given that the system was initialized with input T and a privacy budget of ϵtot .
Theorem 4.1 (Privacy of ϵktelo plans). Let T ,T ′ be any two instances such that ⋃︀T ⊕T ′⋃︀ = 1.
For all k ∈ N+ and rk ∈ℛk ,
P(Rk = rk ⋃︀ Init(T ,ϵtot )) ≤ exp(ϵtot ) × P(Rk = rk ⋃︀ Init(T ′,ϵtot )).
The proof of Theorem 4.1, which appears in the sequel, extends the proof in [13] to support the
V-SplitByPartition operator.
While ϵktelo ensures differential privacy, private information could be leaked via side-channel
attacks (e.g., timing attacks). Privacy engineers who design operators are responsible for protecting
against such attacks; an analysis of this issue is beyond the scope of this paper.
4.4 Privacy Proof
This section presents a proof of Theorem 4.1. We start by introducing some supporting concepts
and notation. (Some notation is adapted from [13].)
Information tracked by the protected kernel The protected kernel maintains the following state,
which we denote as Skernel :● A set of source variables SV .● A data source environment E maps each source variable sv ∈ SV to an actual data source S , as
in E(sv) = S . (Recall that sources can be tables or vectors.)
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● A transformation graph: the nodes are SV and there is an edge from sv to sv′ if sv′ was derived
via transformation from sv . (Note: a partition transformation introduces a special dummy data
source variable whose parent is the source variable being partitioned and whose children are
the variables associated with each partition.)● A stability tracker St maps each source variable sv ∈ SV to a non-negative number: St(sv)
represents the stability (Definition 3.4) of the transformation that derived data source sv from
the initial source, or 1 if sv is the initial source.● A budget consumption tracker B that maps each source variable sv ∈ SV to a non-negative
number: B(sv) represents the total budget consumption made by queries to sv or to any source
derived from sv .● A query history 𝒬 that maps each source variable to information about the state of queries
asked about sv or any of its descendants. Specifically, for sv inSV , 𝒬(sv) returns of a set of
tuples (q, s,σ ,v) where the meaning of the tuple is that query q was executed on data source s
(which is sv or one of its descendants) with σ noise, the result was v . In the context of the proof
a query is any Private→Public operator. Such an operator is assumed to satisfy ϵ-differential
privacy with respect to the data source on which it is applied.● The global privacy budget, denoted ϵtot .
When the protected kernel is initialized, as in Init(T ,ϵtot ), it sets global budget to ϵtot , creates
new source variable svroot , sets E(svroot ) = T , sets St(svroot ) = 1, and B(svroot ) = 0, and adds
svroot to the transformation graph.
Budget Management When a query request is issued to the protected kernel, the protected kernel
uses Algorithm 2 to check whether the query can be answered given the available privacy budget.
Algorithm 2 An algorithm for budget requests
1: procedure Reqest(sv , σ )
2: if sv is the root then
3: If B(sv) + σ > ϵtot , return False. Otherwise B(sv) += σ and return True.
4: else if sv is a partition variable then
5: Let svchild be the child from which the request came..
6: Let r = max{B(svchild) + σ − B(sv), 0}
7: Let ans = Reqest(parent(sv), r ).
8: If ans = False, return False. Otherwise, B(sv) += r and return True.
9: else
10: ans = Reqest(parent(sv), s ⋅ σ ) ▷ s is stability factor of sv wrt its parent
11: if ans = False, return False.
12: B(sv) += σ . Return True.
13: end if
14: end procedure
Configurations A configuration, denoted C = ∐︀Sclient ,Skernel ̃︀, captures the state of the client,
denoted Sclient , and the state of the protected kernel, denoted Skernel . The client state can be
arbitrary, but state updates are assumed to be deterministic.
We can define the similarity of two configurations C and C′ as follows. (Notation: we use
X ′ to refer to component X of configuration C′.) We say that C ∼ C′ iff Sclient = S ′client and
S ′kernel ∼ S ′kernel where Skernel ∼ S ′kernel iff SV = SV ′ and the transformation graphs are identical
and for each sv ∈ SV the following conditions hold:
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● St(sv) = St ′(sv), B(sv) = B′(sv), 𝒬(sv) = 𝒬′(sv), and ϵtot = ϵ ′tot .● ⋃︀E(sv)⊕ E′(sv)⋃︀ ≤ St(sv) = St ′(sv) where ⋃︀x ⊕y⋃︀ is measured as symmetric difference when
the sources x and y are tables and L1 distance for vectors; see Definition 3.4.)
We introduce a lemma that bounds the difference probability between query answers. Let
P(q(E(s),σ) = v) denote the probability that query operator q when applied to data source E(s)
with noise σ returns answer v .
Lemma 4.2. Let C ∼ C′. For any sv ∈ SV with non-empty 𝒬(sv), the following holds:
∏(q,s,σ ,v)∈𝒬(sv) P(q(E(s), σ ) = v) (1)≤ exp(B(sv) × ⋃︀E(sv)⊕ E′(sv)⋃︀) × ∏(q,s,σ ,v)∈𝒬′(sv) P(q(E′(s), σ ) = v)
Proof. Proof by induction on a reverse topological order of the transformation graph.
Base case: Consider a single sv at the end of the topological order (therefore it has no children).
If 𝒬(sv) is empty, it holds trivially. Assume non-empty. Consider any (q, s,σ ,v) ∈ 𝒬(sv). Since
sv has no children, then s = sv . Furthermore, because the only budget requests that apply to sv
are from direct queries, we have (according to Algorithm 2), B(sv) = ∑(q,s,σ ,v)∈𝒬(sv) σ . Since we
assume that any query operator satisfies ϵ-differential privacy with respect to its source input, we
have P(q(E(s),σ) = v) ≤ P(q(E′(s),σ) = v) × exp(σ × ⋃︀E(s) ⊕ E′(s)⋃︀). Substituting sv for s and
taking the product over all terms in 𝒬(sv), we get Eq. (1).
Inductive case: Assume Eq. (1) holds for all nodes later in the topological order. Therefore it holds
for any child c of sv . We can combine the inequalities for each child into the following inequality
over all children,
∏
c∈children(sv) ∏(q,s,σ ,v)∈𝒬(c) P(q(E(s), σ ) = v)≤ ∏
c∈children(sv) exp(B(c) × ⋃︀E(c)⊕ E′(c)⋃︀) × ∏(q,s,σ ,v)∈𝒬(c) P(q(E′(s), σ ) = v)
= exp⎛⎝ ∑c∈children(sv)B(c) × ⋃︀E(c)⊕ E′(c)⋃︀⎞⎠× ∏
c∈children(sv) ∏(q,s,σ ,v)∈𝒬(c) P(q(E′(s), σ ) = v)
There are two cases, depending what type of table variable sv is.
First, consider the case when sv is not a special partition variable. We know by transformation
stability that ⋃︀E(c)⊕E′(c)⋃︀ ≤ s×⋃︀E(sv)⊕E′(sv)⋃︀where s is the stability factor for the transformation.
In addition, ∑c B(c) × s ≤ B(sv) because, according to Algorithm 2, every time a request of σ is
made to child c , a request of s × σ is made to sv . Therefore,
∑
c∈children(sv)B(c) × ⋃︀E(c)⊕ E′(c)⋃︀ ≤ ∑c∈children(sv)B(c) × s × ⋃︀E(sv)⊕ E′(sv)⋃︀≤ B(sv) × ⋃︀E(sv)⊕ E′(sv)⋃︀
Furthermore, observe that each term in (q, s,σ ,v) ∈ 𝒬(c) also appears in 𝒬(sv). In addition,𝒬(sv) includes any queries on sv directly (and we know from an argument similar to the base case
that Eq. (1) holds for these queries). Therefore Eq. (1) holds on sv .
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Now, consider the case where sv is the special partition variable. Letm = maxc B(c). We get the
following ∑
c∈children(sv)B(c) × ⋃︀E(c)⊕ E′(c)⋃︀ ≤ ∑c∈children(sv)m × ⋃︀E(c)⊕ E′(c)⋃︀=m × ∑
c∈children(sv) ⋃︀E(c)⊕ E′(c)⋃︀ =m × ⋃︀E(sv)⊕ E′(sv)⋃︀= B(sv) × ⋃︀E(sv)⊕ E′(sv)⋃︀
The second to last line follows from the fact that sv is partition transformation. The last line follows
from how B(sv) is updated according Algorithm 2. □
Main Proof We use C0(T ,ϵtot ,P0) to denote the initial configuration in which the protected kernel
has been initialized with Init(T ,ϵtot ) and the client state is initialized to P0. We use the notation
C0(T ,ϵtot ,P0) t⇒p C to mean that starting in C0 after t operations, the probability of being in
configuration C is p.
Theorem 4.3. If T ∼1 T ′ and C0(T ,ϵtot ,P0) t⇒p C such that B(svroot ) = ϵ in C, then ϵ ≤ ϵtot and
there exists C′ such that C0(T ′,ϵtot ,P0) t⇒q C′ where C ∼ C′ and p ≤ q ⋅ exp(ϵ).
Theorem 4.1 follows as a corollary from Theorem 4.3.
Proof. Proof by induction on t .
Base case: t = 0. This implies that p = q = 1, ϵ = 0, and C = C0(T ,ϵtot ,P0) and C′ = C0(T ′,ϵtot ,P0).
It follows that C ∼ C′ because we are given that T ∼1 T ′ and the rest of the claim follows.
Inductive case: Assume the claim holds for t , we will show it holds for t + 1. Let C1 be any
configuration such that C0(T ,ϵtot ,P0) t⇒p1 C1 where in C1, we have B(svroot ) = ϵ1.
The inductive hypothesis tells us that ϵ1 ≤ ϵtot and that there exists aC′1 such thatC0(T ′,ϵtot ,P0) t⇒q1
C′1 and C1 ∼ C′1 and p1 ≤ q1 × exp(ϵ1).
Because C1 ∼ C′1, it follows that the client is in the same state and so the next operation request
from the client will be the same in C1 and C′1. The proof requires a case analysis based on the
nature of the operator. We omit analysis of transformation operators or operators that are purely
on the client side as those cases are straightforward: essentially we must show that the appropriate
bookkeeping is performed by the protected kernel. We focus on the case where the operator is a
query operator.
For a query operator, there are two cases: (a) running out of budget, and (b) executing a query.
For the first case, by the inductive hypothesis C1 ∼ C′1 and therefore if executing Algorithm 2
yields False on the protected kernel state in C1, it will also do so on the protected kernel state in
C′1. For the second case, suppose query q is executed on source sv with noise σ and answer v is
obtained. The protected kernel adds the correpsonding entry to the query history 𝒬. Let C denote
the resulting state. Let C′ correspond to extending C′1 in a similar way. Thus C ∼ C′.
It remains to show two things. First, letting B(svroot ) = ϵ , we must show that ϵ ≤ ϵtot . This
follows from Algorithm 2 which does not permit B(svroot ) to exceed ϵtot . Second, we must bound
the probabilities. Suppose that the probability of this query answer in C is p2 and the probability
of this answer on C′ is q2. It remains to show that p1 ⋅ p2 ≤ exp(ϵ) ⋅ q1 ⋅ q2. For this we rely
on Lemma 4.2 applied to svroot with the observations that the product of probabilities bounded
in Lemma 4.2 corresponds to the probabilities in p1 ⋅ p2 that do not trivially equal 1 and that⋃︀E(svroot )⊕ E′(svroot )⋃︀ = 1. □
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Transformation Partition selection Query selection
TV T-Vectorize PA AHPpartition SI Identity
TP V-SplitByPartition PG Grid ST Total
TR V-ReduceByPartition PD Dawa SP Privelet
PW Workload-based SH2 H2
Inference PS Stripe(attr) SHB HB
LS Least squares PM Marginal(attr) SG Greedy-H
NLS Nneg Least squares SU UniformGrid
MW Mult Weights Query SA AdaptiveGrids
HR Thresholding LM Vector Laplace SQ Quadtree
SHD HDMM
SS Stripe(attr)
SW Worst-approx
SPB PrivBayes select
Fig. 1. The operators currently implemented in ϵktelo. Private operators are red, Private→Public operators
are orange, and Public operators are green.
5 OPERATORS AND OPERATOR CLASSES
We now describe in detail the operators and operator classes in ϵktelo. A full list of opera-
tors is shown in Fig. 1 where they are arranged into classes and color-coded by type (Private,
Private→Public, or Public). Along with descriptions of the operator classes we explain their role in
plans and prove supporting properties.
5.1 Transformation Operators
Transformation operators take as input a data source variable (either a table or a vector) and output
a transformed data source (again, either a table or vector). Transformation operators modify the
data held in the kernel, without returning answers. So while they do not expend privacy budget,
they can affect the privacy analysis through their stability (Sec. 3). Every transformation in ϵktelo
has a well-established stability.
Table Transformations. ϵktelo supports table transformations Select,Where, SplitByPartition
, and GroupBy, with stabilities of 1, 1, 1, and 2 respectively. The definitions of the operators are
nearly identical to those described in PINQ [31] and are not repeated here. As ϵktelo currently
handles programs that use linear queries on single tables, the Join operator is not yet supported.
Vectorization. All of the plans in ϵktelo start with table transformations and typically transform
the resulting table into a vector using T-Vectorize (and all later operations happen on vectors). The
T-Vectorize operator is a transformation operator that takes as input a tableT and outputs a vector
x that has as many cells as the number of elements in the table’s domain (recall the discussion of
domain Sec. 3). Each cell in x represents the number of records in the table that correspond to the
domain element encoded by the cell. T-Vectorize is a 1-stable transformation.
The vectorize operation can significantly impact the performance of the code, especially in
high-dimensional cases, as we represent one cell per element in the domain. For this reason we
allow table transformations to reduce the domain size before running T-Vectorize. One of the
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primary reasons for working with the vector representation is to allow for inference operators
downstream. Once in vector form, data can be further transformed as described next.
Vector Transformations. ϵktelo supports transformations on vector data sources. Each vector
transformation takes as input a vector x and a matrix M and produces a vector x′ =Mx. The
linearity of vector transformations is an important feature that is leveraged by downstream inference
operators. The stability of vector transformations is equal to the largest L1 column norm ofM.
The V-ReduceByPartition operator is a 1-stable vector transformation operator that reduces
the dimensionality of the data vector x by eliminating cells from x or grouping together cells in x.
Such transformations are useful to (a) filter out parts of the domain that are uninteresting for the
analyst, (b) reduce the size of the x vector so that algorithm performance can be improved, and (c)
reduce the number of cells in x so that the amount of noise added by measurement operators is
reduced.
V-ReduceByPartition takes as input a partition defining a grouping of the cells in the x. It can
be carried out by representing the partition as a (p × n) matrix P where n is the number of cells in
x, p is the number of groups in the partition, and Pi j = 1 if cell j in x is mapped to group i , and 0
otherwise.
The V-SplitByPartition operator is the vector analogue of the tabular SplitByPartition
operator. It takes as input a partition and splits the data vector x into k vectors, x(1), . . . ,x(k),
each representing a disjoint subset of the original domain. This operator allows us to create
different subplans for disjoint parts of the domain. This is a 1-stable vector transform. (Note: V-
SplitByPartition can be expressed as k linear transforms with matrices that select the appropriate
elements of the domain for each partition.)
5.2 Query Operators
Query operators are responsible for computing noisy answers to queries on a data source. Since
answers are returned, query operators necessarily expend privacy budget. Query operators take a
data source variable and ϵ as input.
For tables, the NoisyCount operator takes as input a table D and ϵ and returns ⋃︀D⋃︀ + η, where η
is drawn from the Laplace distribution with scale 1⇑ϵ . For vectors, the Vector Laplace operator
takes as input a vector x, epsilon, and a set of linear counting queriesM represented in matrix form.
LetM be a matrix of size (m × n). Vector Laplace returnsMx + σ(M)ϵ b where b is a vector ofm
independently drawn Laplace random variables with scale 1 and σ(M) is the maximum L1 norm of
the columns ofM.
For both query operators, it is easy to show they satisfy ϵ-differential privacy with respect to
their data source input [29, 31]. Note, however, in the case the source is derived from other data
sources through transformation operators, the total privacy loss could be higher. The cumulative
privacy loss depends on the stability of the transformations and is tracked by the protected kernel.
5.3 Query Selection Operators
Since each query operation consumes privacy budget, the plan author must be judicious about what
queries are being asked. Recent privacy work has shown that if the plan author’s goal is to answer
a workload of queries, simply asking these queries directly can lead to sub-optimal accuracy (e.g.,
when workload queries ask about overlapping regions of the domain). Instead, higher accuracy can
be achieved by designing a query strategy, a collection of queries whose answers can be used to
reconstruct answers to the workload. This approach was formalized by the matrix mechanism [29],
and has been a key idea in many algorithms [10, 21, 26, 28, 30, 38, 43]. Among these the recent
HDMM algorithm is notable because it uses an optimization-based approach to find the query
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strategy that most-effectively answers the workload. HDMM effectively scales to multi-dimensional
domains, and offers state-of-the-art utility on many workloads [30].
A query selection operator is distinguished by its output type: a set of linear counting queries
M represented in matrix form (i.e., the matrix input to the Vector Laplace operator described
above). As Fig. 1 indicates, ϵktelo supports a large number of query selection operators, most of
which are extracted from algorithms proposed in the literature. While these operators agree in
terms of their output, they vary in terms of their input: some employ fixed strategies that depend
only on the size of x (e.g., Identity and Prefix in Algorithm 1), some adapt to the workload (e.g.,
Greedy-H), some depend on prior measurements (e.g., AdaptiveGrids), etc.
Most query selection operators only rely on non-private information (domain size, workload)
and therefore are of Public type. But there are a few that consult the private data, and thus have
the Private→Public type. For example, Worst-approx is an operator that picks the query from
a workload that is the worst approximated by a current estimate of the data. Such an operator
is used by iterative algorithms like MWEM [19]. Another is PrivBayes select, an operator that
privately constructs a Bayes net over the attributes of the data source, and then returns a matrix
corresponding to the sufficient statistics for fitting the parameters of the Bayes net. This was used
as a subroutine in PrivBayes [47].
5.4 Partition Selection Operators
Partition selection operators compute amatrix Pwhich can serve as the input to theV-ReduceByPartition
and V-SplitByPartition operators described earlier. Of course the matrix Pmust be appropriately
structured to be a valid partition of x.
This is an important operator class since much of recent innovation into state-of-the-art algo-
rithms for answering histograms and range queries has used partitions to either reduce the domain
size of the data vector by grouping together cells with similar counts, or split the data vector into
smaller vectors and leverage the parallel composition of differential privacy to process each subset
of the domain independently. ϵktelo includes partition selection operators AHPpartition and
Dawa which are subroutines from the AHP [49] and DAWA [26] algorithms, respectively. Both of
these operators are data adaptive, and hence are Private→Public. We also introduce new partition
selection operators,Workload-based and Stripe, described in Secs. 8.1 and 9.2 respectively.
5.5 Inference Operators
An inference operator derives new estimates to queries based on the history of transformations and
query answers. Inference operators never use the input data directly and hence are Public. Plans
typically terminate with a call to an inference operator to estimate a final set of query answers
reflecting all available information computed during execution of the plan. Some plans may also
perform inference as the plan executes.
Ideally, an inference method should: (i) properly account for measurements with unequal noise;
(ii) support inference over incomplete measurements (in which derived answers are not completely
determined by available measurements); (iii) should incorporate all available information (including
a prior or constraint on the input dataset); and lastly, (iv) inference should efficiently scale to large
domains. Many versions of inference have been considered in the literature [5, 19, 21, 25, 27, 35,
38, 42, 49] but none meet all of the objectives above. ϵktelo currently supports multiple inference
methods, in part to support algorithms from past work and in part to offer necessary tradeoffs
among the properties above.
All the inference operators supported in ϵktelo take as input a set of queries, represented as a
matrixM, and noisy answers to these queries, denoted y. The output of inference is a data vector xˆ
that best fits the noisy answers—i.e., an xˆ such thatMxˆ ≈ y. The estimated xˆ can then be used to
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derive an estimate of any linear query q by computing q ⋅ xˆ. The inference operator may optionally
take as input a set of weights, one per query (row) inM to account for queries with different noise
scales.
ϵktelo supports two variants of least squares inference, the most widely used form of inference
in the current literature [21, 27, 38]. ϵktelo extends these methods and formulates them as general
operators, allowing us to replicate past algorithms, and consider new forms of inference that
support constraints. The first variant solves a classical least squares problem:
Definition 5.1 (Ordinary least squares (LS)).
xˆ = arg min
x∈Rn ∏︁Mx − y∏︁2 (2)
Our second variant imposes a non-negativity constraint on xˆ:
Definition 5.2 (Non-negative least squares (NNLS)). Given scaled query matrix M and answer
vector y, the non-negative least squares estimate of x is:
xˆ = arg min
x⪰0 ∏︁Mx − y∏︁2 (3)
These inference methods can also support some forms of prior information, particularly if it can
be represented as a linear query. For example, if the total number of records in the input table is
publicly known, or other special queries have publicly available answers, they can be added as
“noisy” answers with negligible noise scale and they will naturally incorporated into the inference
process and the derivation of new query estimates.
We also support an inference method based on a multiplicative weights update rule, which is
used in the MWEM [19] algorithm. This inference algorithm is closely related to the principle of
maximum entropy, and is especially effective when one has measured an incomplete set of queries.
Defining inference under vector transformations. Recall that in the discussion above we describe
inference as operating on a single vector xwith a corresponding querymatrixM. However, plans can
include an arbitrary combination of vector transformations, followed by query operators, resulting
in a collection of query answers defined over various vector representations of the data. ϵktelo
handles this by taking advantage of the structure of vector transformations and query operators,
both of which perform linear transformations, therefore making it possible to map measured queries
back on to the original domain (i.e., a vector produced by the Vectorize operation) and perform
inference there. This allows for the most complete form of inference but other alternatives are
conceivable, for example by performing inference locally on transformed vectors and combining
inferred queries. This might have efficiency advantages, but would likely sacrifice accuracy, and is
left for future investigation.
Inference: impact on accuracy. Because inference is an operator in ϵktelo algorithm authors
are encouraged to use inference consistently, using all available measurements, even if they are
measured in different parts of a plan. In contrast, some existing algorithms use inference in an
ad-hoc manner, performing inference on one set of measurements separately from another set
of measurements. As we show below, for unbiased plans, this is always sub-optimal and ϵktelo
helps to relieves the algorithm designer of the complexity of integrating measured information
properly. The following theorem follows the intuition that any unbiased noisy measurement
provides information about the true data that can lower error, in expectation:
Theorem 5.3. Given any (full rank) matrix M of linear measurements and any linear query q, the
expected error of q is never higher if we include additional linear measurements using least squares
inference.
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Proof. Assuming all measurments have variance 1, the expected error on a query q is ErrorM(q) =
q(MTM)−1qT [27]. In general, the variance of the measurements depends on the privacy budget
and the sensitivity ofM, but they can always be scaled to have variance 1. If we augmentM with
a new linear query b, it becomesM′ = ⌊︀Mb }︀. We can writeM′TM′ =MTM + bT b where bT b is the
outer product. Using the Sherman-Morrison formula [41], we see that
(M′TM′)−1 = (MTM)−1 − 1
1 + b(MTM)−1bT (MTM)−1bT b(MTM)−1
Since (MTM)−1 is positive-definite, b(MTM)−1bT ≥ 0 and the fraction is just some positive constant
c . With some algebraic manipulation, we arrive at the following expression:
ErrorM′(q) = ErrorM(q) − cq(MTM)−1bT b(MTM)−1qT
Letting v = q(MTM)−1bT , we can write that as ErrorM′(q) = ErrorM(q) − cv2 since (MTM)−1 is
symmetric. Clearly cv2 is non-negative, so ErrorM′(q) ≤ ErrorM(q). This completes the proof. □
6 EXPRESSING KNOWN ALGORITHMS
As stated in Sec. 2, ϵktelo represents differentially private algorithms as plans composed over
a rich library of operators, and supports not only simple linear sequences but also plans with
iteration, recursion and branching. To highlight the expressiveness of ϵktelo, we re-implemented
state-of-the-art algorithms as ϵktelo plans. Once the necessary operators are implemented, the
plan definition for an existing algorithm is typically a few lines of code for combining operators
and managing parameters. We performed extensive testing to confirm that reimplementations in
ϵktelo of existing algorithms provide statistically equivalent outputs.
We examined 12 differentially private algorithms for answering low dimensional counting queries
that were deemed competitive3 in a recent benchmark study [20], and one new algorithm published
after the benchmark study [30]. Plan #1-13 in Fig. 2 abstract their ϵktelo implementations as plan
signatures where operators are represented using colored abbreviations.
6.1 Re-implementing existing algorithms
The algorithms are listed roughly in the order in which they were proposed in the literature and
reflect the evolution of increasingly complex algorithmic techniques. The simplest Algorithm, Iden-
tity [11], is a natural application of the Laplace mechanism. It simply measures each component of
the data vector. Algorithms 2 through 5 reflect the evolution of more sophisticated measurements
selection, targeted toward specific workloads. Many of these techniques were originally designed
to support range queries (a small subclass of linear queries) over one- or two-dimensional data.
Privelet [43] uses a Haar wavelet as its measurements, which allows for sensitivity that grows
logarithmically with the domain size, yet allows accurate reconstruction of any range query. The
Hierarchical (H2) technique uses measurements that form a binary tree over the domain, achiev-
ing effects similar to the wavelet measurements.Quadtree [10] is the 2-dimensional realization
of the hierarchical structures. All the algorithms above follow similar design idioms, allowing
us to implement them using operator sequences of the same pattern: Query selection, Query, and
Inference.
All of the algorithms above are data-independent, with constant error rates for any input dataset.
More recent algorithms are data-dependent, displaying different error rates on different inputs,
often because the algorithmic techniques are adapting to features of the data to lower error. The
simplest data-dependent algorithm is Uniform which simply estimates the total number of records
3This is the subset of algorithms that offered the best accuracy for at least one of the input settings of the benchmark.
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ID Cite Algorithm name Plan signature
1 Dwork et al. 2006 Identity SI LM
2 Xiao et al. 2010 Privelet SP LM LS
3 Hay et al. 2010 Hierarchical (H2) SH2 LM LS
4 Qardaji et al. 2013 Hierarchical Opt (HB) SHB LM LS
5 Li et al. 2014 Greedy-H SG LM LS
6 - Uniform ST LM LS
7 Hardt et al. 2012 MWEM I:( SW LM MW )
8 Zhang et al. 2014 AHP PA TR SI LM LS
9 Li et al. 2014 DAWA PD TR SG LM LS
10 Cormode et al. 2012 Quadtree SQ LM LS
11 Qardaji et al. 2013 UniformGrid SU LM LS
12 Qardaji et al. 2013 AdaptiveGrid SU LM LS PU TP[ SA LM]
13 McKenna et al. 2018 HDMM SHD LM LS
14 NEW DAWA-Striped PS TP[ PD TR SG LM] LS
15 NEW HB-Striped PS TP[ SHB LM] LS
16 NEW HB-Striped_kron SS LM LS
17 NEW PrivBayesLS SPB LM LS
18 NEW MWEM variant b I:( SW SH2 LM MW )
19 NEW MWEM variant c I:( SW LM NLS )
20 NEW MWEM variant d I:( SW SH2 LM NLS )
Fig. 2. The high-level signatures of plans implemented in ϵktelo (referenced by ID). All plans begin with a
vectorize transformation, omitted for readability. We also omit parameters of operators, including ϵ budget
shares. I(subplan) refers to iteration of a subplan and TP[subplan] means that subplan is executed on each
partition produced by TP.
in the input and assumes uniformity across the data vector. This simple algorithm also follows the
simple pattern.
A more complex example is the Multiplicative-Weights Exponential Mechanism (MWEM) [19]
which takes a workload of linear queries as input and runs several rounds of estimation, measuring
one workload query in each round, and using the multiplicative update rule to revise its estimate
of the data vector. In each round, the Exponential Mechanism is used to select the workload query
that is most poorly approximated using the current data vector estimate.
In Algorithm 3, we rewrite the algorithm with abstracted subroutines and find out that this
algorithm can be represented as several iterations of the Query selection, Query, and Inference
sequence. In Fig. 2, the iteration inherent to Plan #7 (MWEM) is shown with I ∶ (..).
Other data-dependent algorithms exploit partitioning, in which components of the data vector
are merged and estimated only in their entirety, which uniformity assumption imposed within
the regions. The DAWA [26] and AHP [49] algorithms have custom partition selection methods
which consume part of the privacy budget to identify approximately uniform partition blocks.
The partition selection methods work by finding a grouping of the bins in a vector and are the
key innovations of the algorithms. We encapsulate these subroutines as new operators in our
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Algorithm 3MWEM
1: D ← Protected(source_uri) ▷ Init
2: xˆ ← T-Vectorize(D) ▷ Transform
3: for i = 1 ∶ T do
4: M←WorstApprox(xˆ , ϵ⇑2T ) ▷ Query Selection
5: y← VectorLaplace(M, ϵ⇑2T ) ▷ Query
6: xˆ ←MultWeights(M, y) ▷ Inference
7: end for
8: return xˆ ▷ Output
framework (in the cases above, we added a partition selection operators DawaPartition (PD) in
Plan #9 and AHPPartition (PA) in Plan #8).
UniformGrid and AdaptiveGrid [37] focus on 2D data and both end up with partitioned sets
of measurements forming a grid over a 2D domain. UniformGrid imposes a static grid, while
AdaptiveGrid uses an initial round of measurements to adjust the coarseness of the grid, avoiding
estimation of small sparse regions.
6.2 Re-implementation strategies
The process of re-implementing in ϵktelo this seemingly diverse set of algorithms consisted
of breaking the algorithms down into key subroutines and translating them into operators. To
summarize, the translation strategy typically falls into one of three categories.
The first translation strategy was to identify specific implementations of common differentially
private operations and replace them with a single unified general-purpose operator in ϵktelo.
For instance, the Laplace mechanism (LM), which adds noise drawn from the Laplace distribution,
appears in every one of the 13 algorithms. Noise addition can be implemented in a number of ways
(e.g. calling a function in the numpy.random package, taking the difference of exponential random
variables, etc.). In ϵktelo, all these plans call the same Vector Laplace operator with a single
unified sensitivity calculation.
Another less obvious example of this translation is for subroutines that infer an estimate of x
using noisy query answers. With the exception of Identity andMWEM, each of the algorithms uses
instances of least squares inference, often customized to the structure of the noisy query answers.
For instance, Privelet uses Haar wavelet reconstruction, hierarchical strategies like HB and DAWA
use a tree-based implementation of inference, and others like Uniform and AHP use uniform
expansion. We replaced each of these custom inference methods with a single general-purpose
least squares inference operator (LS operators in Fig. 2). It would still be possible to implement a
specialized inference operator in ϵktelo that exploited particular properties of a query set, but,
given the efficient inference methods described in Sec. 7.6, we did not find this to be beneficial.
Our second translation strategy was to identify higher-level patterns that reflect design idioms
that exist across multiple algorithms. In these cases, we replace one or more subroutines in the
original code with a sequence of operators that capture this idiom. As shown earlier, Plan #2, 3, 4,
5, 6, 10, and 11, 13 all consist of the operator sequence: Query selection, Query (LM), and Inference
(LS), differing only in Query selection method. For other algorithms, this idiom reappears as a
subroutine, as in Plan #8 (AHP) and Plan #9 (DAWA).
Finally, we were left with distinct subroutines of algorithms that represented key intellectual
advances in the differential privacy literature. We encapsulate such subroutines as new operators
(e.g. PA in Plan #8 (AHP) and PD in Plan #9 (DAWA) ) in the framework.
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6.3 Benefits
We highlight the benefits of re-implementing known algorithms in ϵktelo.
Code reuse Once reformulated in ϵktelo, nearly all algorithms use the Vector Laplace operator
and least squares inference. This means that any improvements to either of these operators will be
inherited by all the plans. We show such an example in Sec. 7.6.
Reduced privacy verification effort Code reuse also reduces the number of critical operators
that must be carefully vetted. The operators that require careful vetting are ones that consume
the privacy budget, which are the Private→Public operators in Fig. 1. These are: Vector Laplace,
the partition selection operators for both DAWA [26] and AHP [49], a query selection operator
used by PrivBayes [47], and a query selection operator used by the MWEM [19] algorithm that
privately derives the worst-currently-approximated workload query. In contrast, for the DPBench
code base, the entire code has to be vetted to audit the use and management of the privacy budget.
The end result is that verifying the privacy of an algorithm requires checking fewer lines of code.
For example, to verify the QuadTree algorithm in the DPBench codebase requires checking 163 lines
of code. However, with ϵktelo, this only requires vetting the 30-line Vector Laplace operator.
(Furthermore, by vetting just this one operator, we have effectively vetted 10 of the 18 algorithms
in Fig. 2, since the only privacy sensitive operator these algorithms use is Vector Laplace.).
When we consider all of the DPBench algorithms in Fig. 2, algorithms 1-12, verifying the DPBench
implementation requires checking a total of 1837 lines of code while vetting all the privacy-critical
operators in ϵktelo requires checking 517 lines of code.
Transparency As noted above, ϵktelo plans make explicit the typical patterns that result in
accurate differentially private algorithms. Moreover, ϵktelo plans help clarify the distinctive
ingredients of state-of-the-art algorithms. For instance, DAWA and AHP (Plan #9 and Plan #8
respectively in Fig. 2) have the same structure but differ only in two operators: partition selection
and query selection.
7 IMPLEMENTATION: EFFICIENT MATRIX SUPPORT
Matrices and operations on matrices are central to the implementation of ϵktelo operators but
can become a performance bottleneck. In this section we describe a set of specialized matrix
representation techniques, based on the implicit definition of matrices, which allows for greater
scalability as the size of the data vector grows.
We review next the types of matrix objects in ϵktelo and then, in Sec. 7.2, the different ways
matrices can be represented including implicit matrices. In Sec. 7.3, we decompose the common
matrix operations in ϵktelo into a small set of primitive operations which every implicit matrix
should support. We then describe in Sec. 7.4 a general matrix type from which implicit matrices
can be built, and use that matrix type, in Sec. 7.5, to implement common query selection operators
in ϵktelo. We conclude with Sec. 7.6 describing the implementation of inference using implicit
matrices.
7.1 Matrix types and their operations
Recall that matrices are used to represent three different objects in ϵktelo: sets of workload
queries, sets of measurement queries, and partitions of the domain. In all cases, the matrices
contain one column for each element of a corresponding data vector. In the case of both workload
and measurement matrices, rows represent linear queries. A partition matrix describes a linear
transformation that can be applied to a data vector or to a workload; one row describes a set of
elements of the domain that will be combined after the transformation.
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The key computations on each matrix type are shown in Table 1 (in the left two columns).
Workload matrices and measurement matrices both represent sets of queries and so they share
similar computations (such as query evaluation on a data vector and calculation of sensitivity)
however we only do inference on measurement matrices. Partition matrices are used to reduce and
expand both workload matrices and data vectors.
In common plans, the number of rows in a workload or measurement measurement matrix can
be as large or larger than n, the number of elements in the data vector. Partitions have at most n
rows, but may still be large. For plans operating on large data vectors, where n approaches the size
of memory, these matrices, in standard form, are infeasible to represent in memory and operate on.
To address this, ϵktelo provides flexible and efficient matrix capabilities that can be used for the
efficient implementation of operators.
7.2 Matrix representations: dense, sparse and implicit
The matrix class in ϵktelo supports matrices using a combination of the dense, sparse, and implicit
matrices. These representations differ in their space utilization, their generality, and the efficiency
of the matrix operations they support.
A densem ×n matrix is the standard representation that storesmn values. Obviously, any matrix
can be represented in this manner and all operations in Table 1 are supported. A sparse matrix
stores only non-zero elements of a matrix. Any matrix can be represented in sparse form, but
its efficiency depends on the number of nonzero entries. Where nnz(A) denotes the number of
nonzero elements in matrix A, if nnz(A) ≈mn then sparse matrices do not offer any benefit, and
may even be more expensive to represent than the dense representation. However, if nnz(A) <<mn
there may be significant improvements to performance in using this representation.
An implicit matrix is a virtual representation of a matrix that may not explicitly store all (or
even any) of the elements of the matrix. Because it is a virtual object, it must define appropriate
methods so that computations with the implicit matrix produce correct results. While not all
matrices allow for efficient implicit representations, we have found that many of the matrices used
in ϵktelo operators have a structure that can be exploited for efficient implicit representation.
Note that implicit matrix representations are lossless: they do not approximate some dense matrix
but represent it exactly. Therefore an implicit matrix can always be materialized in sparse or dense
form, although the goal is to perform computations without materialization.
As an example of an implicit matrix, recall the Prefix workload, an encoding of an empirical
CDF, which was used in the example plan (Algorithm 1) of Sec. 2:
Example 7.1 (The Prefix workload: dense, sparse, and implicit). In dense form, the prefix workload
is defined as a lower-triangular matrix containing 1’s. If n = 5 we have:
Wpre =
⎨⎝⎝⎝⎝⎝⎝⎝⎝⎝⎪
1 0 0 0 0
1 1 0 0 0
1 1 1 0 0
1 1 1 1 0
1 1 1 1 1
⎬⎠⎠⎠⎠⎠⎠⎠⎠⎠⎮
A sparse representation ofWpre would store (a list of) only the nonzero elements of this matrix, but
the space complexity of both dense and sparse representations remainsO(n2). In addition, the time
complexity of computing matrix-vector products using the dense or sparse representation isO(n2).
However, the Prefix matrix can be completely specified by a single parameter, n, which is the only
state stored for the implicit version ofWpre. Further, we can evaluate the matrix-vector product
y = Wprex using a simple one-pass algorithm over x: first compute y1 = x1. Then, for k = 2 . . .n,
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Table 1. Types of matrix objects in ϵktelo (workload, measurement, partition) and the key computations
performed in plans, along with the primitive methods required to support each computation.
Key computations by matrix type Primitive methods
Workload matrix, W
Query evaluation Wxˆ Matrix-vector product
L1 Sensitivity ∏︁W∏︁1 Abs, Transpose, Matrix-vector product
L2 Sensitivity ∏︁W∏︁2 Sqr, Transpose, Matrix-vector product
Gram Matrix WTW Transpose, Matrix multiplication
Row indexing wi Transpose, Matrix-vector product
Measurement matrix, M
Query evaluation Mx Matrix-vector product
L1 Sensitivity ∏︁M∏︁1 Abs, Transpose, Matrix-vector product
L2 Sensitivity ∏︁M∏︁2 Sqr, Transpose, Matrix-vector product
Inference (LS) arg minx ∏︁Mx − y∏︁2 Transpose, Matrix-vector product
Inference (NNLS) arg minx≥0 ∏︁Mx − y∏︁2 Transpose, Matrix-vector product
Inference (MW) xˆ(k+1) ∝ xˆ(k) ⊙ exp (g⇑N ) Transpose, Matrix-vector product
g = 0.5MT (Mxˆ(k) − y)
Partition matrix, P
Reduce workload W′ =WP+ Transpose, Matrix multiplication
Reduce data vector x′ = Px Matrix-vector product
Expand workload W =W′P Matrix multiplication
Expand data vector x = P+x′ Transpose, Matrix-vector product
compute yk = yk−1 + xk . Therefore, by representing the Prefix workload implicitly we can achieve
O(1) space complexity and O(n) time complexity for computing matrix-vector products.
7.3 Computing with implicit matrices
Most implicit matrices require very little internal state to be stored. The main challenge is therefore
to insure that all necessary computations involving an implicit matrix can be carried out efficiently,
hopefully without falling back to materialization of the dense form of the matrix. Before defining
additional implicit matrix constructions, we review the key computations ϵktelo matrix objects
must support.
A careful examination of the operators currently implemented in ϵktelo resulted in the list
of key computations in Table 1, where the left two columns describe operations on matrices that
commonly occur in plans. Importantly, these plan-level matrix computations can be decomposed
into just five fundamental matrix methods, which we call primitive methods: matrix-vector product,
transpose, matrix multiplication, element-wise absolute value (abs), and element-wise square (sqr ).
Matrix-vector product takes as input a vector and returns a vector. The multiplication of two
implicit matrices returns a new implicit matrix, as does transpose, which returns another implicit
matrix that represents the transpose linear transformation. Element-wise sqr and abs both return
new implicit matrices.
Below we review the key computations on ϵktelo matrix objects in Table 1, how they can be
decomposed into primitive methods, and implementation considerations. Our goal will then be to
construct implicit matrices that efficiently support the primitive methods.
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Query evaluation and data reduction In ϵktelo plans, matrix-vector multiplication is used by
workload and measurement matrices for query evaluation, and by partition matrices for
reduction of the data vector.
Sensitivity The sensitivity of measurement and workload matrices can be computed using a
combination of primitive methods (abs, sqr, transpose, and matrix-vector product). For a
matrixM, we compute the maximum column sum of abs(M) (for L1 sensitivity) or sqr(M)
(for L2 sensitivity) which can be done by doing a transpose-matrix-vector product with 1 –
the vector of all 1’s:∏︁M∏︁1 =max(abs(M)T 1) ∏︁M∏︁2 =⌈︂max(sqr(M)T 1)
Inference The most common form of inference in ϵktelo plans is based on least squares. While
classical solutions to the least squares problem involve matrix decompositions and com-
putation of the pseudo-inverse, we will show that iterative methods lead to much greater
scalability in combination with our implicit matrix representations. Least squares, non-
negative least squares, and multiplicative-weights inference can all be implemented using
just the matrix-vector product and transpose primitive methods. We will discuss iterative
inference in Sec. 7.6.
Gram Matrix Some workload-adaptive mechanisms like GreedyH and HDMM require the (mate-
rialized) gram matrix of the workload. For a workload W, the gram matrix is WTW. This
computation can be implemented in terms of transpose, matrix multiplication, and materialize.
For extremely large workloads with special structure, whereWTW is much smaller thanW
(like the set of all range queries), a more efficient version can be implemented directly that
avoids using the primitive methods.
Partition reduction and expansion Partition matrices need to be able to reduce the data vector
and workload. They also have to be able to do the reverse expansion operations. As we
show in the proof of Prop. 8.3, because of the special structure of partition matrices, the
pseudo-inverse of any matrix P can be computed as the product of PT and a diagonal matrix
D. Thus, partition matrices simply need the three primitive methods: matrix-vector product,
transpose, and matrix-multiplication.
Row Indexing The MWEM algorithm and its variants (described in Sec. 9.1) use the worst-
approximated query selection operator, which requires row indexing, or materialization
of the ith row of a matrix. This can be implemented in terms of the primitive methods
transpose and matrix-vector product as follows: wi =WT ei , where ei is the ith column of an
identity matrix.
Materialize If a plan requires working with matrices in a manner not supported by the interface
of our implicit matrices, the matrix can always be materialized, at which point standard
implementations of matrix methods can be employed. As in row indexing, materialization
can be performed by a sequence of matrix vector products with the columns of an identity
matrix, i.e., Aei for i = 1, . . .n.
7.4 Generalized matrix construction
ϵktelo contains a matrix class, denoted EMatrix , that generalizes dense, sparse, and implicit
matrices, supporting flexible matrix construction using a small set of specially designed core
matrices which may then be combined with combining operations (union, product, and Kronecker
product). This provides a flexible and extensible mechanism for constructing a wide range of
matrices. The following grammar describes the construction of EMatrix instances:
22
Table 2. Comparison of core implicit matrices to their corresponding sparse and dense representations, in
terms of space usage and time complexity of a matrix-vector product. For sparse and dense matrices, the
time complexity is the same as the space complexity.
Implicit Dense Sparse
Core Matrix Space Usage Time (mat-vec) Space/Time Space/Time
Identity O(1) O(n) O(n2) O(n)
Ones O(1) O(m + n) O(mn) O(mn)
Pre f ix O(1) O(n) O(n2) O(n2)
Su f f ix O(1) O(n) O(n2) O(n2)
Wavelet O(1) O(n logn) O(n2) O(n logn)
CoreMatrix = Identity ⋃︀ Ones ⋃︀ Pre f ix ⋃︀ Su f f ix ⋃︀Wavelet
EMatrix = DenseMatrix ⋃︀ SparseMatrix ⋃︀ CoreMatrix
EMatrix =Union(EMatrix ,EMatrix)
EMatrix = Product(EMatrix ,EMatrix)
EMatrix = Kronecker(EMatrix ,EMatrix)
Unless an EMatrix is defined as a single SparseMatrix or DenseMatrix , we consider it implicit,
since it is not fully materialized.
Core matrices. TheCoreMatrix type forms the basic building block for EMatrix and each is defined
implicitly. The following are custom core matrices we designed to support ϵktelo operators:● Identity: Identity is the simplest building block. It is defined as the matrix I having the
property that Iv = v for all vectors v. Thus, the implementation of matrix-vector product is
trivial. Similarly, transpose, abs, and sqr are simple no-ops.● Ones: Ones is them×n matrix of all ones. Matrix-vector products can be efficiently computed
by summing up the entries of the input vector, and constructing am-length vector with that
value. The transpose is a n ×m Ones matrix, and abs and sqr are simple no-ops. Total is a
special case of the Ones matrix wherem = 1.● Prefix and Suffix: The description of prefix and the algorithm for efficiently computing
matrix-vector products is given in Example 7.1. The transpose of Prefix is Suffix, and abs and
sqr are simple no-ops.● Wavelet: Wavelet is the Haar wavelet transform. Efficient algorithms exist for evaluating
matrix-vector products implicitly with the Haar wavelet [43]. The transpose has a similar
form, but abs and sqr, if needed, must materialize the matrix. However, for this matrix
sensitivity may be computed directly, without going through abs and sqr.
The primitive methods described above have very simple and efficient implementations for the
core matrices. In Table 2 we report the space utilization for each core matrix, along with the time
complexity for one of the most important primitive methods (matrix-vector product). We compare
the complexity of the core implicit matrices with their standard dense and sparse representations,
showing significant reductions in space usage – up to a factor n2. We observe a similar reduction
in time complexity of matrix-vector products by up to a factor of n.
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Composing matrices. Core matrices and arbitrary sparse or dense matrices can be combined using
a Union, Product (including with a constant), and Kronecker Product to form new matrices that are
implicit (or partially implicit).
If matrixM1 andM2 each represent queries, then Union(M1,M2) is a matrix that represents the
union of the queries ofM1 andM2. It is useful for building complex workloads and measurement
matrices, and it also important in plans to bring together all measured queries for global inference.
Product is less frequently needed, but is used for multiplying partition matrices with workload and
measurement matrices.
Kronecker product is especially useful for constructing workload and measurement matrices over
multi-dimensional domains. Suppose our input is a relation R(A,B), we vectorize its projection of
πA(R) to get data vector xA, and we define a set of queries of interest as matrixMA. If we similarly
form a matrix of queriesMB over the vectorization of πB(R) then Kronecker(MA,MB) (denoted
MA ⊗MB in matrix equations) is a matrix that encodes a new set of queries over both attributes A
and B and it contains qai ∧qbj for each qai inMA and each qbj inMB , i.e. it contains the conjunctive
combination of all pairs of queries drawn fromMA andMB .
The formal definition of the Kronecker product is:
Definition 7.2. The Kronecker product A⊗ B between amA ×nA matrix A and amB ×nB matrix
B is amAmB × nAnB matrix defined as:
A⊗ B = ⎨⎝⎝⎝⎝⎝⎪
a11B . . . a1nAB⋮ ⋱ ⋮
amA1B . . . amAnAB
⎬⎠⎠⎠⎠⎠⎮
Kronecker products were first used within the context of a privacy mechanism by McKenna et
al. [30].
We present these as binary operations on implicit matrices, but because they are associative,
they can also be applied to a collection of k sub-matrices. For example for k = 3 we may write
Union(A,B,C) as shorthand notation forUnion(A,Union(B,C)).
Example 7.3. Suppose our input relation is R(aдe, income,marital-status), where age and income
are discretized into a 100 bins, and marital-status is a categorical attribute with 7 possible values,
resulting in a data vector of size 70000. We want to accurately answer range queries on age and
income, broken down by various marital statuses. Thus, we may construct the following workload
using tools from above:
W = Kronecker(Pre f ix ,
Pre f ix ,
Union(Total , Identity,Dense)
where Dense is a 2×7 query matrix with two queries that aggregate over the marital status attribute
into two groups: “married” and “unmarried”. Using Table 3, we see that the only storage required to
representW is the 2×7 Dense matrix, and metadata for the Pre f ix ,Total , and Identity matrices. In
contrast, the sparse and dense representation ofWwould require about 8 GB and 56 GB respectively.
Supporting the primitive methods. Core, sparse, and dense matrices have native support for the
primitive methods discussed previously. When a primitive method is invoked for an EMatrix that
results from one or more of the combining operations, the work is delegated to the constituent
sub-matrices, and thus the matrices formed by composition inherit the performance characteristics
of the sub-matrices. In particular, the key primitive methods can be implemented efficiently on
matrices formed from unions, products, and Kronecker products.
The key performance characteristics of composed matrices are summarized in Table 3.
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Table 3. Space and time complexity of composed matrices, in terms of the complexity of sub-matrices.
Matrix Operation Space Usage Time (mat-vec)
Union(A,B) ⌊︀AB}︀ Space(A) + Space(B) Time(A) + Time(B)
Product(A,B) AB Space(A) + Space(B) Time(A) + Time(B)
Kronecker(A,B) A⊗ B Space(A) + Space(B) nB Time(A) +mA Time(B)
7.5 Matrix constructions for ϵktelo operators
Using the generalized matrix construction described above, we can re-implement many of the
existing query selection and partition operators currently in ϵktelo. We will show in Sec. 10 that
the use of implicit matrices leads to significant improvements in efficiency and scalability, as well
as the reduction of space consumption.
Query selection operators based on range queries. A notable class of query matrices that we can
efficiently represent using the tools from above is an arbitrary collection of range queries. This type
of workload has been extensively studied in the literature and many of the query selection operators
in ϵktelo are specially-designed sets of range queries including H2, Hb, QuadTree, UniformGrid,
and AdaptiveGrid.
Recall that a single range query over a 1-dimensional domain can be specified by a pair of
indices (i, j), and a workload of range queries can be represented as a list of these pairs. This
suggests we can store any range query workload using only O(m) space wherem is the number
of queries. Furthermore, one way to evaluate matrix-vector products is by iterating through each
query one-by-one and evaluating ∑jk=i xk . The time complexity of this approach is O(mn) in the
worst case, which is equivalent to the sparse and dense representations.
Our general matrix construction allows us to do even better by exploiting the fact that any range
query can be expressed as the difference of two prefix queries. Thus the matrix can be represented
as Product(Sparse,Pre f ix) where Sparse is am × n sparse matrix with two non-zero entries per
row. An illustrating example is shown below:
Example 7.4 (Range Queries). A collection of four range queries over a domain of size five,
represented implicitly as the product of a Sparse matrix and the Pre f ix matrix (displayed here in
dense form for illustration purposes):
⎨⎝⎝⎝⎝⎝⎝⎝⎪
0 1 1 1 0
0 0 0 1 1
1 1 1 1 0
0 1 0 0 0
⎬⎠⎠⎠⎠⎠⎠⎠⎮
=
⎨⎝⎝⎝⎝⎝⎝⎝⎪
−1 0 0 1 0
0 0 −1 0 1
0 0 0 1 0−1 1 0 0 0
⎬⎠⎠⎠⎠⎠⎠⎠⎮
⎨⎝⎝⎝⎝⎝⎝⎝⎝⎝⎪
1 0 0 0 0
1 1 0 0 0
1 1 1 0 0
1 1 1 1 0
1 1 1 1 1
⎬⎠⎠⎠⎠⎠⎠⎠⎠⎠⎮
Using this construction, we can evaluate matrix-vector products inO(n+m) time, which is a sub-
stantial improvement over the other representations. The range query construction can be naturally
extended to multi-dimensional domains by replacing Pre f ix with Kronecker(Pre f ix , . . . ,Pre f ix)
and replacing Sparse with a sparse matrix with up to 2d nonzero entries per row, where d is the
number of dimensions of the domain.
A special case of this range query construction is hierarchical and grid-based matrices used
by H2, Hb, and QuadTree. These matrices always have an Identity matrix, and while they can
be represented using the above construction, it is more efficient to represent them in a slightly
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different way as Union(Identity,Product(Sparse,Pre f ix)), which is the representation used in
our empirical evaluation.
Note that even though Product does not natively support abs and sqr , for the case of range
queries, or more generally any matrix with binary values, abs and sqr are simple no-ops.
Representing marginals. A common task for multi-dimensional data analysis is computing the
marginals of a dataset. Marginals may be used both as part of workloads and measurement matrices.
They can be efficiently represented using the tools from above, as demonstrated in Example 7.5.
Example 7.5 (Marginals). Any marginal can be represented as a Kronecker product of Identity
and Total building blocks. For example, the two-way marginal that sums out the second attribute
can be encoded as:
W13 = Kronecker(Identity,Total , Identity)
Further, an arbitrary collection of marginals can be encoded asUnion of these Kronecker products.
All 2-way marginals is:
W2way =Union(Kronecker(Identity, Identity,Total),
Kronecker(Identity,Total , Identity),
Kronecker(Total , Identity, Identity))
Partition operators. The matrices used by partition operators are represented simply as Sparse
matrices. While an implicit definition is possible, it would not offer any improvement in space or
time over the sparse representation.
7.6 Implementing inference
Inference is a fundamental operator that can improve error with no cost to privacy and, accordingly,
we saw that it appeared in virtually every algorithm re-implemented in ϵktelo (as shown in Fig. 2).
But inference can be a costly operation. Recall that the input to inference is a measurement matrix,
denoted by M, containing m queries defined over a data vector of size n, and the list of noisy
answers y. The least squares solution (Eq. (2)) is given by the solution to the normal equations
MTMxˆ =MT y. AssumingMTM is invertible, then the solution is unique and can be expressed as
xˆ = (MTM)−1MT y. Often explicit matrix inversion is avoided, in favor of suitable factorizations
of M (e.g., QR or SVD). However, the time complexity of such “direct” methods is still generally
cubic in the domain size whenm = O(n). In practice we have found that the runtime of such direct
methods is unacceptable when n is greater than about 5000.
Algorithms in prior work [21, 37, 38, 43] have used least squares inference on large domains by
restricting the selection of queries, namely to those representing a set of hierarchical queries. This
allows for inference in time linear in the domain size, avoiding the explicit matrix representation
of the queries. We avoid this approach in ϵktelo because it means that a custom inference method
may be required for each query selection operation, and because it limits the measurement sets
that can be used. In addition, hierarchical methods only work for least squares but not least squares
with non-negativity constraints.
An alternative approach to least squares inference is to use an iterative gradient-based method,
which solves the normal equations by repeatedly computing matrix-vector productsMv andMT v
until convergence. The time complexity of these methods isO(kn2) for dense matrix representations
where k is the number of iterations. In experiments we use a well-known iterative method, LSMR
[16]. Empirically, we observe LMSR to converge in far fewer than n iterations when M is well-
conditioned, which is the case as long as the queries are not taken with vastly different noise scales,
and thus we expect k << n.
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In the original version of this work [46], we demonstrated a significant performance benefit from
the combination of iterative solution methods with sparse matrix representations. This benefit is
amplified when the underlying matrix representation is implicit. Letting Time(M) denote the time
complexity of evaluating a matrix-vector product with M, the time complexity of least squares
inference isO(k ⋅Time(M)) where k is the number of iterations, as before. As shown in Table 2 and
Table 3, Time(M) is often O(n), resulting in a very favorable O(kn) time complexity for inference.
Iterative approaches, using implicit matrices, are well-suited to the other inference methods
in ϵktelo: least squares with non-negativity constraints (Eq. (3)) and multiplicative weights. For
the former, we use the limited memory BFGS algorithm with bound constraints [8]. The time
complexity of this algorithm is the same as LSMR, although the number of iterations needed for
convergence may be different, and there is a constant factor overhead for storing the low-rank
approximation to the inverse Hessian matrix. The multiplicative weights inference algorithm is
defined in an iterative manner and requires the same primitive methods as ordinary least squares
and non-negative least squares.
The combination of our general matrix construction techniques with iterative inference result
in flexible inference capabilities for plan authors. With relative freedom, they can construct mea-
surement matrices, or combine measurements from parts of a plan, and apply a single generic
inference operator, which will run efficiently. In Sec. 10 we show that using iterative least squares
on implicitly represented matrices, we can scale inference to domains consisting of hundreds of
millions of cells while staying within modest runtime bounds, well beyond what is possible with
sparse or dense representations.
8 WORKLOAD-BASED PARTITION SELECTION
In many cases, the goal of a differentially private algorithm (and its corresponding ϵktelo plan) is
to answer a given workload of queries,W, defined in terms of a data vector x. We describe next a
method for reducing the representation of the x vector to precisely the elements required to correctly
answer the workload queries. This is a new partition selection operator, called workload-based
partition selection, which can be used as input to a V-ReduceByPartition transformation.
We define the partition below and prove that, under reasonable assumptions, using such domain
reduction can never hurt accuracy. We provide an algorithm for computing the partition, which can
be executed using implicit workload representations. Later, in Sec. 10.3, we will show empirically
that using this partition in plans can offer significant improvement in both runtime and error.
8.1 The workload-based partition and its properties
For a workload W of linear queries described on data vector x, it is often possible to define a
reduction of x, to a smaller x′, and appropriately transform the workload toW′, so that all workload
query answers are preserved, i.e.Wx =W′x′. Intuitively, such a reduction is possible when a set
of elements of x is not distinguished by the workload: each linear query in the workload either
ignores it, or treats it in precisely the same way. In that case, that portion of the domain need
not be represented by multiple cells, but instead by a single cell in a reduced data vector. It is in
this sense that the reduction is lossless with respect to the workload. Following this intuition, the
domain reduction can be computed from the matrix representationW of the workload by finding
groups of identical columns: elements of these groups will be merged inW to getW′ while the
corresponding cells in x are summed.
Example 8.1. Consider a table with schema Census(age, sex, salary). If the workload consists of
queries Q1(salary ≤ 100K , sex =M) and Q2(salary > 100K , sex = F) the workload only requires a
27
data vector consisting of 2 cells. If the workload consists of all 1-way marginals then no workload-
based data reduction is possible.
Note that calculating this partition only requires knowledge of the workload and is therefore
done in the unprotected client space (and does not consume the privacy budget). The partition
is then input to a V-ReduceByPartition transformation operator carried out by the protected
kernel and its stability is one.
The new workload-based partition selection operator can be formalized in terms of a linear
matrix operator, as follows:
Definition 8.2 (Workload-based partition selection). Let w1, . . . ,wn denote the columns ofW and
let u1, . . . ,up denote those that are unique. For h(u) = {j ⋃︀ wj = u}, define the transformation
matrix P ∈ Rp×n to have Pi j = 1 if j ∈ h(ui) and Pi j = 0 otherwise. The reverse transformation is the
pseudo-inverse P+ ∈ Rn×p .
The matrix P defines a partition of the data, which can be passed to V-ReduceByPartition to
transform the data vector, and P+ can be used to transform the workload accordingly. When P is
passed to V-ReduceByPartition , the operator produces a new data vector x′ = Px where x ′i is the
sum of entries in x that belong to ith group of P. When viewed as an operation on the workload,
P+ merges duplicate columns by taking the row-wise average for each group. This is formalized as
follows:
Proposition 8.3 (properties: workload-based reduction). Given transform matrix P and its
pseudo-inverse P+, the following hold:● x′ = Px is the reduced data vector;● W′ =WP+ is the workload matrix, represented over x′;● The transformation is lossless:Wx =W′x′
Proof. First note that P+ = PTD−1 where D is the p × p diagonal matrix with Dii = ⋃︀h(ui)⋃︀ for h
defined in Def. 8.2. Since P has linearly independent rows, P+ = PT (PPT )−1 and PPT = D because
h(ui) and h(uj) are disjoint for i ≠ j. By definition of P, we see that x ′i = ∑j∈h(ui) x j for 1 ≤ i ≤ p.
Similarly, the ith column ofW′ is given by w′i = 1⋃︀h(ui)⋃︀ ∑j∈h(ui)wj . Since wj = ui when j ∈ h(ui),
we have w′i = ui , which shows thatW′ is justW with the duplicate columns removed. Using these
definitions, we show that the transformation is lossless:
Wx = n∑
i=1wixi =
p∑
i=1ui ∑j∈h(ui)x j =
p∑
i=1w′ix ′i =W′x′
□
As noted in Example 8.1, not all workloads allow for reduction (in some cases, the P matrix
computed above is the identity). But others may allow a significant reduction, which improves
the efficiency of subsequent operators. Less obvious is that workload-based data reduction would
impact accuracy. In fact, many query selection methods from existing work depend implicitly on
the representation of the data in vector form, and these approaches may be improved by domain
reduction. In Sec. 8.4 we measure the impact of this transform on accuracy and efficiency.
We show next that this reduction does not hurt accuracy: for any selected set of measurement
queries, their reduction will provide lower error after transformation.
Theorem 8.4. Given a workload W and data vector x, let M be any query matrix that answers
W. Then if q′ = qP+ is a reduced query and M′ = MP+ is the query matrix on the reduced domain,
Errorq′(M′) ≤ Errorq(M) for all q ∈W.
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Proof. We use the definition of squared error from [29] which shows that ∀q ∈W, Errorq(M)∝∏︁M∏︁21 ∏︁qM+∏︁22 as long asM supportsW. Let mˆj and mj denote the jth column of Mˆ andM respec-
tively. First we show that ∫︁Mˆ∫︁1 ≤ ∏︁M∏︁1:
∫︁Mˆ∫︁1 = max1≤i≤p ∏︁mˆj∏︁
= max
1≤i≤p
∑︁∑︁∑︁∑︁∑︁∑︁∑︁∑︁∑︁∑︁∑︁∑︁
1⋃︀h(uj)⋃︀ ∑j∈h(ui)mj
∑︁∑︁∑︁∑︁∑︁∑︁∑︁∑︁∑︁∑︁∑︁∑︁≤ max
1≤i≤p 1⋃︀h(ui)⋃︀ ∑j∈h(ui) ∏︁mj∏︁1≤ max
1≤i≤p maxj∈h(ui) ∏︁mj∏︁1 == max
1≤i≤n ∏︁mi∏︁1= ∏︁M∏︁1
where h(u) and ui are defined in definition 8.2. Now we show that ∏︁qM+∏︁2 ≤ ∫︁qˆMˆ+∫︁2. Observe
that it is possible to to write q as a linear combination of the rows ofM sinceM supportsW. That
is, there exists a z satisfying zM = q. In general, there may be infinitely many solutions to this
linear system, but z = qM+ is the minimum-norm solution [34]. On the reduced domain, we also
know there exists a zˆ satisfying zˆMˆ = qˆ, or equivalently zˆMP+ = qP+. By making the substitution
zM = q, it’s easy to see that zˆ = z is one solution to this linear system. The minimum norm solution
to this linear system is zˆ = qˆMˆ+, which implies ∏︁zˆ∏︁2 ≤ ∏︁z∏︁2. This shows that ∫︁qˆMˆ+∫︁2 ≤ ∏︁qM+∏︁2,
and it immediately follows that Errorqˆ(Mˆ) ≤ Errorq(M) as desired. □
8.2 Computing the partition
The computation of the partition P in Def. 8.2 is conceptually straightforward: it simply requires
finding the unique columns ofW and grouping them. Finding the unique columns ofW exactly by
inspecting the entries ofW requires an explicit matrix in dense form, or materializing an implicit
matrix. Algorithm 4 provides an efficient method for finding the column groupings that does not
require a explicit matrix representation, relying instead only on the primitive methods of transpose
and matrix-vector product. This approach is highly scalable and is compatible with the implicit
matrix representations of the workload discussed in section 7.
By grouping the elements of h (line 6) we recover the column groupings ofW, because ifwi = wj
then hi = hj and if wi ≠ wj then P(hi = hj) = 0 since hi and hj are continuous random variables.
While algorithm Algorithm 4 is a randomized algorithm, it returns the correct result almost surely.
The probability of incorrectly grouping two different columns is approximately 10−16 with a 64-bit
floating point representation, but if needed we can repeat the procedure k times until the probability
of failure (∼ 10−16k ) is vanishingly small.
9 CASE STUDIES: ϵKTELO IN ACTION
In this section we put ϵktelo into action by developing new algorithms. First, we show that it is easy
to re-design and improve existing algorithms by combining operators in new ways. In particular,
we develop a variant of the MWEM algorithm with significantly improved accuracy. Then we
use ϵktelo to tackle two practical use-cases, constructing new plans which offer state-of-the-art
accuracy. We evaluate all of the proposed plan in Sec. 10.
29
Algorithm 4 An algorithm for workload-based data reduction
1: procedure Compute reduction matrix(W )
2: Input:m × n matrixW
3: Output: p × n matrix P where p ≤ n
4: set v = vector ofm samples from Uniform(0, 1) ▷ 1 ×m
5: compute h =WT v ▷ 1 × n
6: let G = д1, . . . ,дp be groups of common values in h
7: initialize matrix P with zeros ▷ p × n
8: for дi in G do
9: set row i of P to 1 in each position of дi
10: end for
11: return P
12: end procedure
9.1 Recombination of operators to improve MWEM
Using ϵktelo, we design new variants of the well-known Multiplicative Weights Exponential
Mechanism (MWEM) [19] algorithm. MWEM repeatedly derives the worst-approximated workload
query with respect to its current estimate of the data, then measures the selected query, and uses the
multiplicative weights update rule to refine its estimate, often along with any past measurements
taken. This repeats a number of times, determined by an input parameter.
When viewed as a plan in ϵktelo, a deficiency of MWEM becomes apparent. Its query selection
operator selects a single query to measure whereas most query selection operators select a set
of queries such that the queries in the set measure disjoint partitions of the data. By the parallel
composition property of differential privacy, measuring the entire set has the same privacy cost as
asking any single query from the set. This means that MWEM could be measuring more than a single
query per round (with no additional consumption of the privacy budget). To exploit this opportunity,
we designed an augmented query selection operator that adds to the worst-approximated query by
attempting to build a binary hierarchical set of queries over the rounds of the algorithm. In round
one, it adds any unit length queries that do not intersect with the selected query. In round two, it
adds length two queries, and so on.
Adding more measurements to MWEM has an undesirable side effect on runtime, however.
Because it measures a much larger number of queries across rounds of the algorithm and the
runtime of multiplicative weights inference scales with the number of measured queries, inference
can be considerably slower. Thus, we also use replace it with a version of least-squares with a
non-negativity constraint (NNLS) and incorporate a high-confidence estimate of the total which is
assumed by MWEM.
In total, we consider three MWEM variants: an alternative query selection operator (Plan #18),
an alternative inference operator (Plan #19), and the addition of both alternative operators (Plan
#20). These are shown in Fig. 2 and evaluated in Sec. 10.
9.2 Census case-study
The U.S. Census Bureau collects data about U.S. citizens and releases a wide variety of tabulations
describing the demographic properties of individuals. We consider a subset of the (publicly released)
March 2000 Current Population Survey. The data report on 49,436 heads-of-household describing
their income, age (in years), race, marital status, and gender. We divide Income into 5000 uniform
ranges from (0, 750000), age in 5 uniform ranges from (0, 100), and there are 7, 4 and 2 possible
values for status, race and gender.
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We author differentially private plans for answering a workload of queries similar to Census
tabulations. This is challenging because the data domain is large and involves multiple dimensions.
The workloads we consider are: (a) the Identity workload (or counts on the full domain of 1.4M
cells), (b) a workload of all 2-way marginals (age × gender, race × status, and so on), and (c) a
workload suggested by U.S. Census Bureau staff: Prefix(Income) which consists of all counting
queries of the form (income ∈ (0, ihiдh ), age=a, marital=m, race=r , gender=д) where (0, ihiдh) is an
income range, and a,m, r ,д may be values from their resp. domains, or <any>.
There are few existing algorithms suitable for this task. We were unable to run the DAWA [26]
algorithm directly on such a large domain. In addition, it was designed for 1d- and 2d- inputs. One
of the few algorithms designed to scale to high dimensions is PrivBayes [47]. While not a workload-
adaptive algorithm, PrivBayes generates synthetic data which can support the census workloads
above. We use PrivBayes as a baseline and we use ϵktelo to construct three new plans composed
of operators in our library. The proposed plans are: Hb-Striped (Plan #15), Dawa-Striped (Plan
#14), and PrivBayesLS (Plan #17). The first two “striped” plans showcase the ability to adapt lower
dimensional techniques to a higher dimensional problem avoiding scalability issues. The third plan
considers improving on PrivBayes by changing its inference step.
Both Hb-Striped and Dawa-Striped use the same plan structure: first they partition the full
domain, then they execute subplans to select measurements for each partition, and lastly, given the
measurement answers, they perform inference on the full domain and answer the workload queries.
The partitioning of the initial step is done as follows: given a high dimensional dataset with N
attributes and an attribute A of that domain, our partitions are parallel “stripes” of that domain for
each fixed value of the rest of the N − 1 attributes, so that the measurements are essentially the
one-dimensional histograms resulting from each stripe. In the case of Hb-Striped (fully described
in Algorithm 5), the subplan executed on each partition is the Hb algorithm [38], which builds an
optimized hierarchical set of queries, while in the case of the Dawa-Striped the subplan is DAWA
algorithm [26]. Note that while the data-independent nature of the Hb subplan means that all the
measurements from each stripe are the same, that is not the case with Dawa, which potentially
selects different measurement queries for each stripe, depending on the local vector it sees. For our
experiments, the attribute chosen was Income, and for Dawa-Striped we set the DAWA parameter
ρ to 0.25.
Algorithm 5 Hb-Striped
1: D ← Protected(source_uri) ▷ Init
2: x← T-Vectorize(D) ▷ Transform
3: R ← StripePartition(Attr) ▷ Partition Selection
4: xR ← V-SplitByPartition (x, R)
5: M← ∅
6: y← ∅
7: for x′ ∈ xR do
8: M←M∪ Hb(x′) ▷ Query Selection
9: y← y∪ VecLaplace(x′,M, ϵ) ▷ Query
10: end for
11: xˆ← LS(M,y)
12: return xˆ ▷ Output
Selection in HB-Striped’s subplans are data-independent, unlike in DAWA-Striped, so the exact
same set of measurements will be selected on each partition. As introduced in Sec. 7.4, this set
of measurements can be represented compactly as a Kronecker product. So we introduce a new
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selection operator Stripe(attr) where a global measurement is composed by constructing the
Kronecker product of HB measurements on the stripe dimension and Identity matrices on other
dimensions.HB-Striped_kron (Plan #16) is a sequence starting with the new SS selection operator,
followed by Laplace measurement and LS inference. The complete plan is shown in Algorithm 6.
This non-iterative alternative implementation is more efficient and we compare the efficiency and
scalability of the two implementations in Sec. 10.2.1.
Algorithm 6 Hb-Striped_kron
1: D ← Protected(source_uri) ▷ Init
2: x← T-Vectorize(D) ▷ Transform
3: M← StripeSelect(Attr) ▷ Query Selection
4: y← VecLaplace(x,M, ϵ3) ▷ Query
5: xˆ← LS(M,y)
6: return xˆ ▷ Output
Our final plan is a variant of PrivBayes in which we replace the original inference method
with least squares, retaining the original PrivBayes query selection and query steps. We call this
algorithm PrivBayesLS and it’s fully described in Algorithm 7.
Algorithm 7 PrivBayesLS
1: D ← Protected(source_uri) ▷ Init
2: x← T-Vectorize(D) ▷ Transform
3: M← PBSelect(x,ϵ2) ▷ Query Selection
4: y← VecLaplace(x,M, ϵ3) ▷ Query
5: xˆ← LS(M, y) ▷ Inference
6: returnW ⋅ xˆ ▷ Output
We evaluate the error incurred by these plans in Sec. 10.1.2, and show that the best of our plans
outperforms the state-of-the-art PrivBayes by at least 10× in terms of error.
9.3 Naive Bayes case-study
We also demonstrate how ϵktelo can be used for constructing a Naive Bayes classifier. To learn a
NaiveBayes classifier that predicts a binary label attribute Y using predictor variables (X1, . . . ,Xk)
requires computing 2k+1 1d histograms: a histogram on Y , histogram on each Xi conditioned on
each value on Y . We design ϵktelo plans to compute this workload of 2k+1 histograms, and use
them to fit the classifier under the Multinomial statistical model [24].
We develop two new plans and compare them to two plans that correspond to algorithms
considered in prior work.Workload represents the 2k+1 histograms as a matrix, and uses Vector
Laplace to estimate the histogram counts. This corresponds to a technique proposed in the literature
[9]. The other baseline is Identity (Plan 1): it estimates all point queries in the contingency table
defined by the attributes, adds noise to it, and marginalizes the noisy contingency table to compute
the histograms.
The first new plan isWorkloadLS which runsWorkload followed by a least squares inference
operator, which for this specific workload would make all histograms have consistent totals. Our
second plan is called SelectLS (fully described in Algorithm 8) and selects a different algorithm
(subplan) for estimating each of the histograms. SelectLS first runs 2k+1 domain reductions to
compute 2k+1 vectors, one for each histogram. Then, for each vector, SelectLS uses a conditional
statement to select between two subplans: if the vector size is less than 80, Identity is chosen, else
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Algorithm 8 SelectLS
1: D ← Protected(source_uri) ▷ Init
2: x← T-Vectorize(D) ▷ Transform
3: R ←MargReduction(x , Att) ▷ Partition Selection
4: M← ∅, y← ∅
5: for i = 1 ∶ k do ▷ Iterate over Dimensions
6: x′ ← V-ReduceByPartition (x,Ri )
7: if DomainSizei > 80 then
8: R′ ← RDawa (x′,ϵ1/k) ▷ Partition Selection
9: x′R ← V-ReduceByPartition (x, R′)
10: M← GreedyH(x′R ) ▷ Query Selection
11: y← y∪ VecLaplace(x′R ,M, ϵ2/k) ▷ Query
12: else
13: M←M∪ Identity(x′) ▷ Query Selection
14: y← y∪ VecLaplace(x′,M , ϵ/k) ▷ Query
15: end if
16: x← V-ReduceByPartition (x′,Ri ) ▷ Domain Expansion
17: end for
18: xˆ← LS(M,y)
19: return xˆ ▷ Output
a subplan that runs DAWA partition selection followed by Identity is chosen. We combine the
answers from all subplans and use least squares inference jointly on all measurements. The inputs
to the inference operator are the noisy answers and the workload of effective queries on the full
domain. In Sec. 10.1.3 we show that our new plans not only outperform existing plans, but also
approach the accuracy of the non-private classifier in some cases.
10 EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
Our prototype implementation of ϵktelo, including all algorithms and variants used below, consists
of 7.9k lines of code: 25% is the framework itself, 46% consist of operator implementations, 14%
consist of definitions of plans used in our experiments and the remaining 15% are tests and examples
provided for the users.
In this section, we first report the results of using ϵktelo in the case studies of Sec. 9. Then
compare efficiency and scalability of plans and inference operators with different implementation
choices. Finally, we evaluate the impact of workload-based domain reduction introduced in Sec. 8.1.
10.1 Case studies
10.1.1 MWEM: improved query selection & inference. We evaluate the three new plans described in
Sec. 9.1 which were variants of ϵktelo plan for the MWEM [19] algorithm. Recall that the variants
were achieved by replacing key operators in the MWEM plan. These algorithms are data-dependent
algorithms so we evaluate them over a diverse collection of 10 datasets taken from DPBench [20].
The results are shown in Table 4.
The performance of the first variant, line (b), shows that the augementing query selection with
H2 can significantly improve error: by a factor of 2.8 on average (over various input datasets) and
by as much as a factor of 7.9. (Error and runtime measures are normalized to the values for the
original MWEM; min/mean/max error values represent variation across datasets.) Unfortunately,
this operator substitution has a considerable impact on performance: the added queries slow down
by a factor of more than 300. But combining augmented query selection with NNLS inference,
line (d), reduces runtime significantly: it is still slower than the original MWEM algorithm, but by
33
Table 4. For three new algorithms, (b), (c), and (d), the multiplicative factors by which error is improved,
presented as (min, mean, max) over datasets. For runtime, the mean is shown, normalized to the runtime of
standard MWEM. (1D, n=4096, W=RandomRange(1000), ϵ = 0.1)
MWEM Variants ERROR IMPROVEMENT RUNTIME
Query Selection Inference min mean max mean
(a) worst-approx MW 1 1 1 1
(b) worst-approx + H2 MW 1.03 2.80 7.93 354.9
(c) worst-approx NNLS, known total 0.78 1.08 1.54 1.0
(d) worst-approx + H2 NNLS, known total 0.89 2.64 8.13 9.0
Table 5. Results on Census data; domain size 1,400,000; scale of error is indicated under each workload.
Workload
Algorithm
Identity(1e−9) 2-way Marg.(1e−7) Prefix (Income)(1e−7)
Identity 24.18 12.04 18.97
PrivBayes 76.93 65.31 28.70
PrivbayesLS 5.86 13.29 36.81
Hb-Striped 70.31 21.91 4.13
Dawa-Striped 3.43 1.96 2.50
only a factor of 9. Using the original MWEM query selection with NNLS inference, line (c), has
largely equivalent error and runtime to the original MWEM. Thus, the performance gains of NNLS
inference over MW appear to be most pronounced when the number of measured queries is large.
10.1.2 Census data analysis. In this section we compare the ϵktelo plans proposed in Sec. 9.2,
measuring their effectiveness in computing workloads inspired by Census tabulations. We compare
our three new plans PrivBayesLS, Hb-Striped, and DAWA-Striped with baseline algorithms
Identity (Plan #1 in Fig. 2) and PrivBayes, our ϵktelo reimplementation of a state-of-the-art
algorithm for high dimensional data [47].
Table 5 presents the results for each workload. We use scaled, per-query L2 error to measure accu-
racy. First, we find that PrivBayes performs worse than Identity on all workloads. Interestingly, on
Identity and 2-way marginal workloads, it is improved by our new plan PrivBayesLS that replaces
its inference step with least squares. PrivBayes may be more suitable to input data with higher
correlations between the attributes. Second, our striped plans Hb-Striped and Dawa-Striped offer
significant improvements in error. Dawa-Striped is the best performer: the data-dependent nature
of DAWA exploits uniform regions in the partitioned data vectors. This shows the benefit from
ϵktelo in allowing algorithm idioms designed for lower-dimensional data to be adapted to high
dimensional problems.
10.1.3 Naive Bayes classification. We evaluate the performance of the Naive Bayes classifier on
Credit Default [44], a credit card clients dataset which we use to predict whether a client will default
on their payment or not. The data consists of 30k tuples and 24 attributes from which one is the
target binary variable “Default” and the rest are the predictive variables. We used the predictive
variables X3 −X6 for a total combined domain size of 17, 248.
In our experiments we measure the average area under the curve (AUC) of the receiver operating
characteristic curve across a 10-fold cross validation test. The AUC measures the probability that a
randomly chosen positive instance will be ranked higher than a randomly chosen negative instance.
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Fig. 3. New ϵktelo plansWorkloadLS and SelectLS result in NaiveBayes classifiers with lower error than
plans that correspond to algorithms from prior work, and approach the accuracy of a non-private classifier
for various ϵ values.
We repeat this process 10 times (for a total of 100 unique testing/training splits) to account for the
randomness of the differentially private algorithms and report the {25, 50, 75}-percentiles of the
average AUC. As a baseline we show the majority classifier, which always predicts the majority
class of the training data and also show the unperturbed classifier as an upper bound for the utility
of our algorithms.
In Fig. 3 we report our findings: each group of bars corresponds to a different ϵ value and each
bar shows the median value of the AUC for an algorithm. For each DP algorithm we also plot the
error bars at the 25 and 75 percentiles. The dotted line is plotted at 0.5067 and shows the AUC
of the majority classifier. The continuous red line is the performance of the non-private classifier
(Unperturbed). For larger ϵ values we see that our plans significantly outperform the baseline and
reach AUC levels close to the unperturbed. As ϵ decreases, the quality of the private classifiers
degrades and for ϵ = 10−3 the noise added to the empirical distributions drowns the signal and the
AUC of the private classifiers reach 0.5, which is the performance of a random classifier. Our plan
WorkloadLS is essentially the algorithm of [10] with an extra inference operator. This shows that
the addition of an extra operator to a previous solution significantly increases its performance.
10.2 Implementation comparison
As discussed in Sec. 7, most ϵktelo operators involve performing operations on matrices, which
can be implemented using several different representations: dense, sparse, and implicit. All of them
are lossless representations of the underlying matrix, so the choice of implementation does not
influence plan accuracy. However, it could impact the efficiency and scalability.
In this section, we compare these alternative implementations. We first evaluate how the choice
of matrix implemenation impacts scalability and efficiency of plans. Then we have a focused
experiment on a key matrix operation: inference.
10.2.1 Scalability and efficiency of plans. To understand the impact of different physical implemen-
tations for plans in Fig. 2, we compare the runtime of plans using implicit measurement matrices,
which are new, with previous implementations from [46], which can use either dense or sparse
matrices. For the plans HDMM and HB-striped_kron, which contain operators that were not
supported in the previous implementation, we make the comparison by converting implicit matrices
to their sparse and dense representations. We measure the average end-to-end execution time over
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Fig. 4. Plan execution time with different implementation of measurement matrices with Identity workload
5 random trials for three implementations of each plan along increasing domain sizes. We stop any
execution when it runs for more than 1000s.
Fig. 4a shows runtime for low-dimensional plans. All plans are applied on two-dimensional
domain square domains, except for DAWA and Greedy-H, which are designed for one-dimensional
domains. Plan #19 MWEM variant b is omitted because it timed out even at the smallest domain
we tested here. The results show that for most plans, the implicit implementation has the best
scalability. Also, looking at a fixed domain size, the implicit representation usually leads to faster
runtime than its dense and sparse counterparts.
The performance improvement is most pronounced with plansHB,QuadTree and UniformGrid
where implicit representation can scale to domains larger by a factor of 1000x. These algorithms
construct hierarchical/grid-based measurement matrices and can be represented as Range Queries, a
special instance of the implicit matrices. As discussed in Sec. 7.5, this representation is compact and
supports faster matrix-vector products. There are few cases where the difference between imple-
mentations is less pronounced. DAWA and Greedy-H share the same special selection subroutine
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which needs to materialize the matrix. AdaptiveGrid has a plan that requires iterating through a
potentially large number of partitions, and this step appears to dominate the runtime.
Results for high-dimensional plans are shown in Fig. 4b. For the first three plans, sparse and
implicit representations exhibit similar performance and scale to domains at least 10x larger than
using dense. For the last plan, HB-Striped_kron, recall from Sec. 9.2 that this plan is an alternative
way of expressing the same algorithm as the HB-Striped plan, but instead of partitioning the data,
it uses Kronecker products to express queries compactly in terms of submatrices. By comparing
adjacent figures, we can see the approach based on Kronecker products allows plans to scale to at
least 10x larger domains across implementations of the submatrices. As another comparison point
that illustrates the benefits of Kronecker products, in the last figure, we include “Basic sparse”, an
alternative implementation of the HB-Striped_kron plan where the query Kronecker product
matrix is replaced with a materialized sparse matrix over the full domain.
10.2.2 Scalability of inference. Inference is one of the most computation-intensive operators in
ϵktelo especially for large domains resulting from multidimensional data. Next, we show the
impact of implementation choices on the scalability of inference. Fig. 5 shows the computation
time for running our main inference operators (LS and NNLS) as a function of data vector size.
Recall that the methods described in Sec. 7.6 provide efficiency improvements by using iter-
ative solution strategies (iterative instead of direct in the figure) and exploiting sparsity in the
measurement matrix (sparse or implicit as opposed to dense in the figure). For this experiment, we
fix the measured query set to consist of binary hierarchical measurements [21]. Fig. 5 shows that
using sparse matrices and iterative methods allow inference to scale to data vectors consisting of
millions of counts on a single machine in less than a minute. The use of implicit matrices permits
additional scale-up for both LeastSqares and NNLS. We also compare against the inference
method introduced by Hay et al., denoted ‘Tree-based’ in the figure. It is an algorithm that is
logically equivalent to LeastSqares but specialized for hierarchically structured measurements.
The general-purpose LeastSqares implementation is able to scale to much larger domains.
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Fig. 5. For a given computation time, the proposed iterative and implicit inference methods permit scaling
to data vector sizes as much as 1000× larger than previous techniques using direct approaches and dense
matrices.
10.3 Workload-driven data reduction
Next, we evaluate the impact of workload-driven data reduction, as described in Section 8.1. For
selected algorithms, Table 6 shows that performing workload-driven data reduction improves both
error and runtime, almost universally.
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Table 6. Runtime (sec) and error improvements resulting from workload-based domain reduction.
(W=RandomRange, small ranges. Original domain size: AHP (128,128), DAWA 4096, Identity (256,256), HB
4096)
Algorithm
Original
Domain
Reduced
Domain
Factor
Improved
Error/Runtime Error/Runtime Error/Runtime
AHP 1.68e−5 777.10 1.30e−5 145.00 1.29 5.36
DAWA 1.06e−5 0.23 1.07e−5 0.25 0.99 0.92
Identity 4.74e−5 0.66 1.64e−5 0.90 2.89 0.73
HB 3.20e−5 0.05 2.38e−5 0.08 1.34 0.62
The biggest improvement in error (a factor of 2.89) is witnessed for the Identity algorithm.
Without workload-driven reduction, groups of elements of the domain are estimated independently
even though the workload only uses the total of the group. After reduction, the sum of the group
of elements is estimated and will have lower variance than the sum of independent measurements.
The biggest improvement in runtime occurs for the AHP algorithm. This algorithm has an
expensive clustering step, performed on each element of the data vector. Workload-driven reduction
reduces the cost of this step, since it is performed on a smaller data vector. It also tends to improve
error because higher-quality clusters are found on the reduced data representation.
10.4 Summary of Findings
The experiments evaluate the accuracy, scalability, and efficiency of ϵktelo. The case studies show
that ϵktelo can lead to more accurate algorithms with relatively little effort from the programmer:
the MWEM algorithm can be improved significantly by replacing a few key operators; for the
Census and Naive Bayes case studies, ϵktelo can be used to design novel algorithms from existing
building blocks, offering state-of-the-art error rates. The study of scalability and efficiency found
that implicit matrix representation can lead to huge performance gains, increasing scalability by a
factor 1000x in some cases. The generalized inference implementation scales well and outperforms
specialized algorithms. Finally, the evaluation shows the workload-driven data reduction improves
accuracy and runtime, almost universally, so that it can be added to all workload-based plans with
little cost and significant potential for gains.
11 RELATEDWORK
ϵktelo was first described by the authors in [46]. The open-source codebase for ϵktelo is publicly
available and the results of [46] are currently under SIGMOD reproducibility review. Thismanuscript
extends [46] by providing a unified and improved approach to the efficient representation of matrix
objects. The new matrix representations are fundamental to ϵktelo plans as they are used to
represent workload queries, measurement queries, and partitions. This innovation impacts many
aspects of ϵktelo, including inference and workload-based partition selection. Existing plans were
re-implemented using these new matrix techniques to measure their impact and were demonstrated
to allow ϵktelo plans to scale to far larger data vectors than previously possible.
The implicit matrix representation furthers the notion that there can be a separation between
the matrix as a logical representation and its physical implementation. Implementation choices can
be transparent to plan authors and open up interesting directions for developing highly optimized
implementations.
A number of languages and programming frameworks have been proposed to make it easier
for users to write private programs [13, 31, 36, 39]. The Privacy Integrated Queries (PINQ) platform
began this line of work and is an important foundation for ϵktelo. We use the fundamentals of
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PINQ to ensure that plans implemented in ϵktelo are differentially private. In particular, we adapt
and extend a formal model of a subset of PINQ features, called Featherweight PINQ [13], to show
that plans written using ϵktelo operators satisfy differential privacy. Our extension adds support
for the partition operator, a valuable operator for designing complex plans.
Additionally, there is a growing literature on formal verification tools that prove that an algorithm
satisfies differential privacy [7, 17, 45]. For instance, LightDP [45] is a simple imperative language in
which differentially private programs can be written. LightDP allows for verification of sophisticated
differentially private algorithms with little manual effort. LightDP’s goal is orthogonal to that of
ϵktelo: it simplifies proofs of privacy, while ϵktelo’s goal is to simplify the design of algorithms
that achieve high accuracy. Nevertheless, an interesting future direction would be to implement
ϵktelo operators in LightDP to simplify both problems of verifying privacy and achieving high
utility.
Concurrently with [46], Kellaris et al. [23] observed that algorithms for single-dimensional
histogram tasks share subroutines that perform common functions. The authors compare a number
of existing algorithms along with new variants formed by combining subroutines, empirically
evaluating trade-offs between accuracy and efficiency. The focus is exclusively one-dimensional
tasks.
The use of inference in differentially private algorithm design is not new [6, 21, 42], and is used in
various guises throughout recent work [5, 10, 25, 26, 29, 30, 35, 43, 49]. Proserpio et al. [35] propose
a general-purpose inference engine based on MCMC that leverages properties of its operators to
offset the otherwise high time/space cost of this form of inference. Our work is complementary in
that we focus on a different kind of inference (based on least squares) in part because it is used,
often implicitly, in many published techniques. A deeper investigation of alternative inference
strategies is a compelling research direction.
Our use of implicit matrices was inspired by their use in [30], where Kronecker products were
used extensively to represent high-dimensional workloads and measurements. ϵktelo implicit
matrices extend and generalize those matrix constructions. Techniques that use measurements
based on wavelets [6] (for range query workloads) and Fourier basis queries [43] (for marginals),
are examples in which measurement and inference is performed without materialization of a matrix,
and so they could be seen as implicit methods. Hierarchical query sets [21, 38] also admit inference
methods that do not require materialization of a matrix. Each of these examples relies on the special
structure of the query sets they use in order to achieve scalability. Our approach in ϵktelo is more
flexible: it allows the plan author to focus on what to measure, rather than how to measure it and
how to perform inference efficiently.
ϵktelo provides an execution framework for privacy algorithms, but does not perform plan-
level optimization. The matrix mechanism [29] (and more recently the high-dimensional matrix
mechanism [30]) formulates an optimization problem that corresponds to query selection in ϵktelo.
The mechanism then estimates the selected queries and applies least squares inference. This can be
seen as a kind of optimization, but in a limited plan space which admits only data-independent plans.
Recent work [24] examines the problem of algorithm selection—selecting the best algorithm for a
given private dataset and task—and proposes a meta-algorithm, Pythia, capable of choosing among
a set of “black box” algorithms. In contrast, ϵktelo takes a “white box” approach, decomposing
existing algorithms into modular operators and allowing plan authors to design new algorithms.
Pythia could be adapted to automatically select operators in ϵktelo and, in fact, Pythia could be
implemented as an ϵktelo plan.
As noted above, our efficiency and scalability efforts have so far been focused on a centralized
setting where ϵktelo plans are executed on a single machine and data vectors fit in memory. As
such, ϵktelo currently makes use Python’s pandas and SciPy modules for relational and matrix
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processing, respectively. In the future it may be beneficial for ϵktelo to use a distributed data
processing platform such as Apache’s Hive[1] , Accumulo[3] , or Spark[4] , or to consider the
innovations of academic projects such as Weld [33], LaraDB [22], SPOOF [14], and Samsara [40],
many of which support parallelized matrix operations.
However, these platforms do not provide easy scalability solutions for ϵktelo, and are not
substitutes for exploiting the special matrix structure present in ϵktelo operators, which will be
necessary and beneficial in any execution platform that is adopted. (For example, no computing
platform is so efficient that it obviates the need to reduce a matrix from 56GB to less than 100
bytes, as in Example 7.3.) Given our implicit matrix representations, the main bottleneck becomes
the (always dense) representation of the data vector. This could be distributed across a cluster
and operated on using a variety of systems, however, there is reason to believe, due to limits of
differentially private estimation, that most measurements will be performed on projections of the
input relation, and will therefore result in a collection of in-memory data vectors rather than one
monolithic vectorized dataset.
12 CONCLUSIONS
We have described the design and implementation of ϵktelo: an extensible programming frame-
work and system for defining and executing differentially private algorithms. Many state-of-the-art
differentially private algorithms can be specified as plans consisting of sequences of operators,
increasing code reuse and facilitating more transparent algorithm comparisons. Algorithms imple-
mented in ϵktelo are often faster and scale to larger domains by leveraging ϵktelo’s compact
internal data representations, based on implicit matrices. Using ϵktelo, we designed new algorithms
that outperform the state of the art in accuracy on linear query answering tasks.
By allowing plan authors to focus on the simpler problem of designing a plan, and shifting the
burden of implementing privacy and accuracy-critical operators to privacy engineers, we hope
ϵktelo will be a key driver in the wider adoption of differential privacy.
ϵktelo is extensible and, through the addition of new operators, we hope to continue to expand
the classes of tasks that can be supported. For example, we would like to use ϵktelo to build a
differentially-private SQL query-answering system. This requires a number of extensions, including
support for specifying and enforcing more complex privacy policies over multiple input relations,
extended relational transformations, and accompanying stability analysis. In addition, we believe
even greater scalability could be achieved by the addition of new inference operators that do not
require full vectorization of the input data. Lastly, ϵktelo allows for a wide range of plans to be
expressed and implemented in multiple ways, but it lacks plan-level automated optimization (some
operators like HDMM and Greedy-H do perform operator-level optimization). An optimizer for
ϵktelo would need to balance efficiency and accuracy metrics and reason about the equivalence of
plans that contain randomized components.
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